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Aggregation and Law
abstract. If a plaintiff brings two claims, each with a 0.4 probability of being valid, the
plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims are based on independent events, and thus the
probability of at least one of the claims being valid is 0.64. If a plaintiff brings two independent
claims, and neither of them alleges misconduct sufficient to justify a remedy, the plaintiff will
usually lose, even if the claims jointly allege sufficient wrongdoing to justify a remedy. Thus, as a
general rule, courts refuse to engage in what we call factual aggregation (the first case) and
normative aggregation (the second case), as well as other forms of aggregation that we identify.
Yet we show numerous exceptions to this rule in private and public law. Notably, in public law,
the hybrid rights doctrine permits courts to aggregate two weak constitutional claims as long as
one involves free exercise of religion. In private law, certain tort and contract doctrines also
permit aggregation. We criticize the courts’ inconsistent approaches to aggregation, and propose
conditions under which courts should (and should not) aggregate.
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introduction
Suppose you are invited to dinner by a friend. You are a bit tired, but not
extremely tired, so that reason by itself would not make you decline the
invitation. You also want to spend the evening with your family, but this
reason standing alone would not convince you to stay at home. Finally, you are
also a bit pressed for time because you need to prepare a lecture for tomorrow,
but once again you would not miss the dinner for that reason only. It is quite
plausible that even if none of these reasons, standing alone, is sufficient for you
to decline the invitation, the aggregation of all three reasons would be
sufficient. Nevertheless, we suspect that most people, while aggregating the
three reasons for themselves and declining the invitation, would not say to
their friend that they cannot come to dinner because: (1) they are tired;
(2) they want to spend the evening with their family; and (3) they need to
prepare a lecture for tomorrow and are therefore pressed for time. They would
instead choose the strongest of the three reasons and provide it as the sole
reason for declining the invitation.
Consider another possibility. Your friend invites you to dinner a week in
advance. Peering into the future, you predict that with some (low) probability
you will be too tired, that with some (low) probability your children will need
help with their homework, and that with some (low) probability you will need
to prepare for work on the following day. You realize that while each event will
individually come to pass with low probability, the probability that at least one
of the events will come to pass is quite high. Even so, you would not say to
your friend (if you want to keep your friendship) that while each reason you
have for turning down the invitation is low probability, they are jointly high
probability. Most likely, you would turn down the invitation on the basis of the
most probable reason.
These puzzles, which we call “aggregation puzzles,” have counterparts in
the law. Consider a plaintiff who brings two separate claims against the
defendant arising from the same event, a car accident. The plaintiff argues that
the defendant committed a strict liability tort by driving an inherently
dangerous vehicle and, in the alternative, that the defendant caused a tort
through negligent driving. To win on the strict liability claim, the plaintiff
must prove that the vehicle was inherently dangerous, but the plaintiff can
provide evidence to show only a 40% probability of inherent dangerousness. In
addition, the plaintiff can show only a 40% probability of negligence. A court
would hold against the plaintiff on both claims because she cannot meet the
50% preponderance-of-the-evidence threshold for either claim. However, if the
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two claims are independent,1 the plaintiff can show a 64% probability that the
defendant committed either one tort or the other.2 Yet courts do not permit
this type of cross-claim factual aggregation.
For another example, this one involving claims arising from two distinct
events, consider a plaintiff who can prove with 40% probability that the
defendant engaged in a material breach of a contract, and also can prove with
40% probability that the defendant engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation to
induce the creation of the contract. Under either theory, the plaintiff would be
entitled to rescission of the contract. Yet again, although the probability that at
least one claim is valid is 64% (assuming that the claims are independent), the
plaintiff would lose, because courts do not permit cross-claim factual
aggregation.
A second type of factual aggregation, which we will call cross-element factual
aggregation, occurs across the elements that make up a single claim. For
example, a negligence claim has elements of fault and causation, each of which
the plaintiff must prove to establish liability. Say the plaintiff can prove each
with 60% probability. If the probabilities of the two elements are not
aggregated, the plaintiff wins, because the probability of each element being
valid is higher than 50%, and so the plaintiff has established all requisite
elements of her claim. But if the probabilities of the elements are aggregated,
the plaintiff loses, because the probability that the defendant was at fault and
caused the harm is only 36%.3 There is uncertainty about whether and to what
extent courts engage in cross-element factual aggregation.
A third type of factual aggregation, which we call within-element factual
aggregation, occurs when the plaintiff proposes several alternative factual
theories that satisfy a single element of a claim. Say, for example, that the
plaintiff suing for negligence has two distinct theories for why the defendant
was at fault, and she can prove that each theory is true with 40% probability. If
the probabilities of the two theories are not aggregated, the plaintiff will fail to
establish the element of fault by preponderance of the evidence. If the
probabilities are aggregated, however, the plaintiff will successfully establish
fault, because the probability that one theory or the other is true is 64%. Unlike
cross-claim factual aggregation, within-element factual aggregation is routine
in American jurisprudence.

1.

2.
3.

Two claims are independent if the probability of the two claims being valid is independent;
that is, if one claim is valid, it does not affect the probability of the other claim being valid.
So long as two claims are not fully dependent, aggregation is not precluded. For further
discussion of dependence, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
The probability of at least one claim being valid is 1 - (1 - 0.4)2 = 0.64.
0.62 = 0.36.
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Aggregation does not always require uncertainty. Suppose that a plaintiff
can show with certainty that the defendant induced the creation of a contract
with misleading remarks that fall just short of fraudulent misrepresentation,
and that the defendant subsequently engaged in a breach that falls just short of
material. A court would typically not grant rescission, but not because the
plaintiff failed to establish facts with sufficient probability. The plaintiff would
lose because, for each claim, she failed to allege sufficient wrongdoing. Yet one
could argue that—even if each is insufficient standing alone—the two bad acts
together justify rescission.
We will call this type of aggregation normative aggregation. Like factual
aggregation, it has cross-claim, cross-element, and within-element variations.
Combining the independently insufficient claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation and material breach described above, for example, would
entail cross-claim normative aggregation. The normative weights of the two
claims, neither of which standing alone is sufficient to establish liability, would
be aggregated, and the combined weight of the two claims would establish
liability.
Although courts do not usually permit this type of aggregation, such
aggregation does occur in one important class of cases. When a neutral and
generally applicable statute burdens religious exercise alone, it does not violate
the First Amendment. But if the law simultaneously burdens another
constitutional right, such as the right to free speech—even if that burden is not
sufficient to violate that constitutional right independently—the law may
nonetheless be overturned because of the aggregate burden it imposes on two
constitutional rights.4
One can also imagine cases that share aspects of cross-claim factual
aggregation and cross-claim normative aggregation. Suppose that the plaintiff
can prove material breach with 40% probability, and can prove with certainty
that the defendant induced the creation of the contract with misleading
remarks that fall just short of fraudulent misrepresentation. One might argue
that the plaintiff should be entitled to rescind the contract, but courts do not
permit this type of cross-claim mixed aggregation.
Another type of aggregation takes place across persons. Suppose that a firm
pollutes the air, and ten nearby residents claim that they were injured by the
pollution. Each resident can show that she breathed in the pollution and that
her medical condition deteriorated after the pollution, but all residents suffer
from preexisting respiratory ailments, and thus cannot show with probability
above 50% that the pollution, rather than their preexisting conditions, caused

4.

6

See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
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their harm. They would therefore lose their cases. Yet if each resident could
show that the probability that the pollution exacerbated her medical condition
is, say, 10%, then the residents can collectively prove that the probability that at
least one of them was injured was greater than 50%, and therefore that the firm
should pay damages5 (although not necessarily everyone’s damages—an issue
we will address later). We will call this type of aggregation cross-person
aggregation. Cross-person aggregation could be factual, as in the preceding
example, but could also be normative or mixed.6
These examples illustrate an important vulnerability at the heart of the law.
They reflect the fact that law relies on legal categories that organize the judicial
treatment of disputes. These categories operate at different levels of generality,
including bodies of law (tort, contract), claims (strict liability, negligence), and
elements (offer, acceptance, breach, harm). These categories are important, and
it is hard to imagine how the law would work without them. But they also
require courts to disregard information that is relevant to an overall evaluation
of the asserted wrongdoing.
This happens in the ways we have illustrated. First, where two claims
concern a single act by the defendant, some of the factual information that is
relevant for evaluating the defendant’s wrongdoing may need to be disregarded
when one claim is evaluated, and other factual information disregarded when
the other claim is evaluated. An act that is not clearly a strict liability tort and at
the same time not clearly a negligence tort may nonetheless clearly be one or
the other (assuming that the strict liability and negligence claims are at least
partially independent) and thus a wrongful act that should entitle the victim to
a remedy. A similar phenomenon transpires when the two (or more) claims
relate to two (or more) events, and each event is considered separately, isolated
from one another. Even if—for each event standing alone—the plaintiff cannot
establish that the defendant caused the harm, the plaintiff may nonetheless be
able to establish that the defendant caused the harm in at least one of the events.
Conversely, even if in each event standing alone the plaintiff can establish that
the defendant caused one harm, he may not be able to establish that the

5.
6.

The probability that at least one resident was injured is 1 - (1 - 0.1)10 ≈ 0.65.
The phrase “aggregation” could have various meanings in different contexts. In particular,
the law allows a type of aggregation for evidentiary purposes through the prior-acts and
similar-crimes doctrines applied in criminal law, see infra notes 93-102 and accompanying
text, according to which past behavior of the accused could serve as evidence to prove his
guilt in the present case. What is typical of this type of aggregation is the dependence between
the accused’s different misbehaviors; a defendant is arguably more likely to have committed
a crime given his demonstrated involvement in past crimes. Our focus instead is on
aggregation of independent claims, although we admit that sometimes the distinction
between the two types of aggregation is blurred.
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defendant caused both harms. In this way, as we explore further below,
aggregation can lead to less liability in some cases.
Second, the law relies heavily on thresholds even when wrongdoing is
typically a continuous variable.7 A plaintiff must reach one normative threshold
along the continuum of increasingly severe wrongdoing to show fraudulent
misrepresentation and another normative threshold to show material breach.
But where an event falls just short of the thresholds in two separate legal
dimensions, or two events individually fall short of the threshold, the threshold
may be exceeded when those dimensions, or events, are aggregated. The
defendant who does not quite engage in fraudulent misrepresentation and does
not quite engage in material breach may nonetheless have acted wrongfully in
her overall treatment of the plaintiff. Conversely, a criminal defendant
prosecuted for assault who falls just short of the thresholds for both the
insanity defense and a claim of self-defense may not be blameworthy enough to
justify conviction.
Third, the law generally treats individuals as the unit of analysis, even
though wrongdoing can often be probabilistic, in a sense transcending
individuals. The point is not just that a firm that causes a small amount of
harm to a large number of people may escape liability because no individual
possesses a sufficient incentive to bring suit. This is a familiar problem, one
that is addressed by the class action system. The problem is that even if each
individual faced zero legal costs, she would lose her case. The probability that
she was harmed is low or, alternatively, does not quite reach the normative
threshold for each individual, but across many persons, that probability
becomes significant.
Each of these cases bears a family resemblance to the others. They all stem
from the problem of aggregating two types of things: factual information and
normative weight. In the bulk of this Article, we will examine additional
examples of how such aggregation might take place in torts, contracts, criminal
law, and public law. We will also identify actual instances of aggregation in
several of those fields and provide some tentative proposals for reforming how
courts incorporate aggregation. Our focus will be general explanations and

7.

8

See, for example, John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt
and Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750, 751 (1964), which argues that the law typically requires
judges to choose winners and losers on an “all-or-nothing” basis even when the outcomes
are harsh. Coons calls for court-imposed compromises based on the idea that there is a
continuum of solutions between the two polarized ones: “[I]mposed compromise shall
mean the apportionment of right and duty between opposed litigants by a court according
to a quantitative standard that is not limited to the favoring of one party to the exclusion of
his adversary.” Id. at 753.
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proposals that apply to aggregation in all fields of law. We summarize our
conclusions here.
All of the cases reflect a familiar rules/standards tradeoff. The law
disaggregates in order to reduce decision costs for courts and other
decisionmakers, including ordinary people and firms who want to obey the
law. The basic breakdown of wrongdoing into bodies of law, and then those
bodies of law into claims, and those claims into elements, brings a regimented
clarity to the process of learning and applying the law. But the disaggregation
of wrongdoing into a series of rules comes at a cost: morally relevant
information is lost.
To some extent, the law already recognizes this problem. Certain doctrines
permit courts in certain cases to re-aggregate disaggregated claims. We will
discuss examples later, but for now a few such examples that might be cited are
the alternative liability rule and market share liability doctrine in tort law, the
unconscionability doctrine in contract law, and the hybrid rights doctrine for
the Free Exercise Clause in constitutional law. These doctrines permit courts to
aggregate claims that would otherwise be kept separate under more
conventional types of legal analysis.
However, we will argue that, because of its failure to aggregate more
broadly or consistently, the law falls short in many significant respects, some of
them illustrated by our examples above. Our minimal goal is to propose “reaggregation doctrines” that permit courts to aggregate factual and normative
claims where doing so does not create excessive confusion. We show that
aggregation would often lead to more liability compared to nonaggregation,
but occasionally the reverse is true and aggregation would lead to less liability.
Our more ambitious goal is to suggest general parameters for the optimal level
of aggregation in the law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I through IV analyze the
nonaggregation problem in tort law, contract law, criminal law, and public law,
respectively. Part V discusses explanations and justifications for courts’ refusal
to aggregate, offers a theory for analyzing aggregation problems in the law, and
proposes methods of implementation. The Conclusion summarizes the
discussion.8

8.

Aggregation has largely been ignored by legal writers. A notable exception is Saul Levmore,
Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001). Levmore’s discussion, however, is
limited to factual aggregation and is focused on tort law, specifically on factual aggregation
across the elements of the same cause of action. See infra discussion accompanying notes 3335. Some parts of Levmore’s analysis—in particular, his discussion of implementation
difficulties in aggregation—could be relevant to some types of factual aggregation that we
discuss, but not to others. Levmore, supra, at 726-33. Another exception is Alon Harel &
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i. tort law
A. Factual Aggregation
Factual aggregation in tort law is common for determining whether the
defendant committed a particular element of a claim, like fault or causation in a
negligence claim. Take, for example, a case where “a car parked at the curb by
the defendant begins to roll downhill” and hits the plaintiff, and the reason for
the car’s roll could be that the defendant “either failed to set the brakes or failed
to cut the wheels properly against the curb, or failed to put the car in parking
gear.” It would be common practice for the court or jury to find that the
defendant’s fault caused the accident even without knowing what the
defendant’s faulty behavior was, as long as the aggregated probability that some
faulty behavior of the defendant caused the harm is sufficiently high.9 In this
way, courts allow what we call within-element factual aggregation for proving

9.

10

Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal Responsibility for Unspecified
Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261 (2009). Harel and Porat analyze factual aggregation in
criminal law and focus on situations where the accused is charged with two or more separate
offenses and none of them can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but there is no
reasonable doubt that he committed at least one of them. Id. at 264-65. Frederick Schauer
and Richard Zeckhauser propose aggregating probabilities across cases outside the judicial
context. See Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse
Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 41-51 (1996). They argue that it would make sense for a
school to dismiss a teacher against whom several complaints of sexual harassment had been
made in the past, even if each complaint, considered independently, would not constitute
sufficient reason for dismissal. Id. at 44. Schauer and Zeckhauser maintain, however, that
such an argument is inapplicable to criminal proceedings. Id. at 41, 46, 52. Daryl Levinson
considers cases where remedies like school desegregation decrees are based on a kind of
aggregation—of multiple past behaviors by government entities (a kind of cross-claim
factual aggregation) against multiple persons (a kind of cross-person aggregation). See
Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1354-55
(2002). Finally, a related literature exists on the problem of multimember decisionmaking
bodies. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75 (2003) (discussing decisionmaking by
multimember judicial panels); Hayden J. Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors
Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on
Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473 (1983) (discussing jury verdicts where jurors agree on the
outcome but disagree on the facts). Unlike this literature, we assume a single judicial
decisionmaker. For a factfinding theory that opposes factual aggregations of any kind, see
Kevin M. Clermont, Death of Paradox: The Killer Logic Beneath the Standards of Proof, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986346, and in
particular footnote 124, which relates directly to our Article and proposes that the paradoxes
that motivate our Article do not exist.
For this example and others, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154 (2000).
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fault. Courts, however, do not engage in cross-claim factual aggregation.
Consider the following example:
Example I.1. The Inherently Dangerous Vehicle. The defendant hit the
plaintiff while driving. The plaintiff argues that the defendant is strictly
liable because he was driving an inherently dangerous vehicle and, in
the alternative, that the defendant caused the harm by his negligent
driving. The plaintiff, however, cannot establish his claims by the
preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff can only show
that the probability of each claim is 40%.
Nonaggregation results in both claims being rejected. If the court deciding
the case instead aggregates the two claims, and it determines that those claims
are independent, it will impose liability on the defendant. The probability that
the defendant wrongfully hit the plaintiff would be 64%, enough to satisfy the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.10 Courts, however, do not aggregate
in cases like Example I.1.11 As a result, defendants escape liability even when the
probability that they wrongfully harmed the plaintiff is greater than 50%,
simply because the plaintiff cannot establish what exactly the wrong committed
by the defendant was.
The next two examples represent a cross-claim factual aggregation relating
to two separate events.
Example I.2. Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, One Injury. The plaintiff
was admitted to the hospital while having a heart attack. Initially, the
doctor at the emergency room misdiagnosed him and sent him home.
When the plaintiff returned two days later, another doctor in the
cardiology department allegedly gave him poor treatment. The plaintiff
did not fully recover. He sues the hospital for vicarious liability, arguing
that the two doctors were negligent, and that each doctor’s negligence
is a but-for cause of his injury. The evidence before the court indicates

10.
11.

The probability that either claim is valid is 1 - (1 - 0.4)2 = 0.64.
In Candler General Hospital, Inc. v. McNorrill, 354 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), the
plaintiff allegedly fell and hurt his knee while being transferred by a nurse from a stretcher
to a wheelchair. Id. at 873. The plaintiff argued that the hospital was vicariously liable for the
nurse’s negligence, as well as directly liable for negligence due to the inadequacy of the
equipment and personnel in the emergency room. Id. at 874. The court ordered that both
claims should be presented to a jury, but it did not contemplate aggregation of the claims.
Id. at 876-77. It is quite possible that a jury would hold in favor of the hospital if both claims
were examined separately but would impose liability if the claims were aggregated.
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that the probability that each of the doctors caused the harm
negligently is only 40%.
In contrast to Example I.1, in Example I.2 there are two separate events
occurring at different times and places, and the same defendant (the hospital)
could be (vicariously) liable for their injurious effects. If the two claims relating
to the two events are evaluated separately, liability should not be imposed. If
instead the two claims are aggregated, the court should hold the defendant
liable, as long as the events are independent, even though it cannot determine
which of the two events was the wrongful one.
It seems that courts would not aggregate in cases represented by Example
I.2. However, two special doctrines of tort liability arguably could allow
aggregation in multiple-event, one-injury cases. First, courts have been willing
to impose liability on hospitals and their employees when a plaintiff has
established that he suffered harm from the negligence of one of the hospital’s
employees, even if the identity of the specific employee who negligently caused
the harm remained unknown. Courts have imposed liability in these cases
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.12 Although these cases usually involve
one event,13 the doctrine might conceivably apply to two events if a plaintiff
could establish that he suffered harm from an unidentified employee’s
negligence during one of those events.14
Second, courts might be willing to impose liability on hospitals and their
employees under the “alternative liability rule” from Summers v. Tice15 if a
plaintiff could establish that those employees were each negligent, even if the
plaintiff could not prove which employee’s negligence caused the harm at issue.
Under the alternative liability rule, as first codified in the Restatement (Second)

12.

13.
14.

15.

12

For example, in Fieux v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Clinic, P.C., 978 P.2d 429 (Or. Ct. App.
1999), a clamp was left behind on the plaintiff’s heart during a surgery. Id. at 431. The
plaintiff could not prove which member of the medical staff, composed of three nurses and
one surgeon, was negligent. He relied on res ipsa loquitur to infer negligence. Id. The court
permitted the plaintiff to proceed to trial against several defendants on that theory,
overturning the trial court’s directed verdict for the hospital. Id.
See, e.g., id.
For example, had the plaintiff in Fieux undergone two consecutive but distinct procedures
that involved heart clamps, he could have attempted to demonstrate that the harm he
suffered must have occurred because of some employee’s negligence during one of the two
procedures.
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (imposing liability on two hunters for the injury one of them caused
the plaintiff, when both hunters negligently shot in the plaintiff’s direction, and the identity
of the one who actually injured the plaintiff was not established).
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of Torts,16 and later in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm,17 when the plaintiff can establish that several defendants acted
tortiously toward him, and that at least one of them caused his harm, each of
the defendants bears the burden to show that it was not his tortious conduct
that caused the harm. Although the alternative liability rule, like res ipsa
loquitur, has traditionally been applied to cases of one event during which
multiple defendants act simultaneously, its logic also seems to apply to
multiple-event cases in which defendants act at different moments in time, as
long as the tortious conduct of each defendant can be proven by the
preponderance of the evidence. Both the Restatement (Second) and Restatement
(Third) treat this interpretation of the alternative liability rule as viable.18
In the next example, despite similarities to Example I.2, courts would
clearly avoid any aggregation.
Example I.3. Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries. Same facts
as in Example I.2, except that it is alleged that each doctor negligently
caused the plaintiff separate harm: the doctor in the emergency room
allegedly caused him necrosis in his leg, and the doctor in the
cardiology department allegedly injured his heart. The probability of
each allegation is 40%.

16.
17.
18.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28(b) (2010).
See id. § 28(b) cmt. k; id. § 28 reporters’ note (citing several cases suggesting that the
simultaneity of the defendants’ acts is not a precondition for the applicability of the
alternative liability rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. h (“The cases
thus far decided in which the rule stated in Subsection (3) has been applied all have been
cases in which all of the actors involved have been joined as defendants. All of these cases
have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or substantially so, and all of them have
involved conduct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the same risk of
harm, on the part of each actor. It is possible that cases may arise in which some
modification of the rule stated may be necessary because of complications arising from the
fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of
the effect of lapse of time, or because of substantial differences in the character of the
conduct of the actors or the risks which they have created. Since such cases have not arisen,
and the situations which might arise are difficult to forecast, no attempt is made to deal with
such problems in this Section. The rule stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to preclude
possible modification if such situations call for it.”). Several courts, however, have rejected
that application of the alternative liability rule. See Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 690
A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting the argument that the alternative liability rule applies
when defendants did not act simultaneously); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717,
725 (Haw. 1991) (same).
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With no aggregation, the hospital—as well as the two doctors—will bear no
liability, even though the probability that the plaintiff suffered harm caused by
wrongdoing for which the hospital is responsible is 64%. Aggregation, instead,
would lead to the imposition of liability on the hospital if the events are
independent. Indeed, analogizing from the alternative liability rule of Summers
v. Tice, one could argue that if the plaintiff could show that the two doctors
were each negligent, each doctor should be held liable unless he can establish
that his negligence did not cause the plaintiff’s harm. The Restatement (Third)
justifies the alternative liability rule in part by explaining that “between two
culpable defendants and an innocent plaintiff, it is preferable to put the risk of
error on the culpable defendants.”19 Although the rule does not apply, under
current law, to two-event, two-injury cases, its underlying “risk-of-error” logic
arguably applies to such cases, as well as to incidents of one event, one injury
(as in Summers v. Tice) and two events, one injury (as in Example I.2).
If aggregation occurs in Example I.3, what amount of liability would be
imposed on the hospital? At a minimum, the hospital would be liable for the
less severe injury. Alternatively, the hospital could be liable for the average of
the two injuries, for the more severe injury, for a probabilistic recovery, or for
some other amount. Each of these options has both advantages and
disadvantages that we discuss later.20 At this stage, it suffices to say that
nonaggregation in cases represented by both Examples I.2 and I.3 would allow
defendants to escape liability even when the probability that they wrongfully
harmed the plaintiff (or are vicariously liable for the harm) is greater than 50%,
just because the plaintiff cannot identify with sufficient certainty the
exact wrongful injurious behavior that caused his harm (Example I.2), or which
of the two harms suffered by him is the result of an injurious behavior
(Example I.3).21
So far, aggregating claims would lead to more rather than less liability. But
this is not always so. In Example I.3, with different numbers, aggregation
could lead to less rather than more liability. To see why, assume that the

19.

20.
21.
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b) cmt. g. The comment explains that “[i]n at least
some cases, it appears that the defendants’ better access to proof and doubts about the
plaintiff’s ability to extract that evidence from the defendants . . . have influenced the courts
to employ burden shifting.”
See infra Subsection V.C.3.
We might also imagine a one-event, two-injury (or two-harms-from-one-injury) case that
would fall between Examples I.2 and I.3, in which a plaintiff establishes that he suffered two
distinct injuries (or two separate harms from one injury) during a single event and attempts
to hold one defendant liable. As in Examples I.2 and I.3, aggregating the probabilities that
the defendant caused each injury (or each harm) could enhance liability in such a case.
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probability of the claims with respect to each doctor is 60% instead of 40%.
With no aggregation the hospital would be liable for both injuries; with
aggregation, the hospital will be liable for one injury only. The probability that
the claims against both doctors are correct is only 36%,22 and 36% is not
enough to establish liability. The probability that at least one of the claims is
correct, however, is 84%,23 more than enough to establish liability.
Note that less liability in this example is arguably consistent with tort law
goals. Tort law seeks to impose liability if, and only if, it is more probable than
not that the defendant wrongfully caused the plaintiff’s injury. In the general
case, it is probably assumed by the law that the point where the adverse effects
of too much and too little liability (and compensation) equalize is where the
probability of the plaintiff’s allegations is 50%.24 Under this assumption, if the
probability that both injuries to the plaintiff were wrongfully caused by the two
doctors is only 36%, liability for both harms should not be imposed.
The point that aggregating claims could lead to either more or less liability
in cases involving two injuries brings us to an interesting conclusion. When an
injurer cannot know in advance whether, in his case, aggregation would
increase or reduce his liability, aggregation would not necessarily change the
injurer’s expected liability and so might not affect his behavior.
To illustrate, assume that in our example the hospital anticipates that there
could be two injuries where in each case the harm would be 100, and the
probability that a doctor’s negligence caused each injury will be either 40% or
60% for both injuries (with equal probabilities). With no aggregation the
hospital’s expected liability if the two allegations are made is 100. There is a
50% likelihood that the probability of each allegation is 40% and the hospital
pays zero, and a 50% likelihood that the probability of each allegation is 60%
and the hospital pays 200. But the hospital’s expected liability is also 100 with
aggregation. If courts will aggregate, then there is still a 50% likelihood that the
probability of each allegation is 40%, but now the hospital would pay 100,
because there is a probability of 64% that a doctor was responsible for at least
one of the two injuries. There is also a 50% likelihood that the probability of
each allegation is 60%, but now the hospital would pay 100 here as well,
because there is a probability of 84% that a doctor was responsible for at least

22.
23.
24.

0.62 = 0.36.
1 - (1 - 0.6)2 = 0.84.
For more on the logic of the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule and its role in allocating
the risk of error, see ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 143-48 (2005). For a
critical account of the argument that the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule maximizes
social welfare, and for the argument that the efficient level of proof is contextual, see Louis
Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012).
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one of the two injuries, but a probability of only 36% that a doctor was
responsible for both injuries. Once expected liability with or without
aggregation is the same, the injurer’s incentives are the same as well.
Aggregation, however, would be of utmost importance for efficient
incentives in two-injury cases if the injurer could know in advance that the
probabilities of each of the claims against him would typically be lower than
50%, or would typically be higher than 50%. In the extreme case where the
probabilities are always lower than 50%, with no aggregation the injurer never
pays and is underdeterred, while with aggregation he pays sometimes and is
better deterred.25 Conversely, if the injurer could know in advance that the
probabilities in his case would always be higher than 50%, a rule of no
aggregation could result in overdeterrence,26 because under the rule of no
aggregation the injurer’s expected liability would be higher than the expected
harm of his behavior. Aggregation would reduce expected liability, making it
closer to the expected harm and improving deterrence.
One type of situation where the injurer could know in advance whether the
probabilities of liability would be lower or higher than 50% is a medical
malpractice case, in which evidence regarding causation is likely to be statistical
in nature. A doctor can often predict whether the probability of causation that a

25.

26.
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Note, however, that in cases represented by Example I.3, under certain assumptions (which
we believe very rarely hold), aggregation could have some overdeterrence effects that should
be contrasted with the underdeterrence effects that nonaggregation yields. Thus, if the
second doctor in this example is fully informed, in “real” time, about the first doctor’s
alleged negligent infliction of harm on the plaintiff, and also that the probability of this
allegation is substantial but lower than 50%, he (or the hospital) would take excessive
precautions so as not to bear liability if something goes wrong and the plaintiff suffers a
second injury. An analogous argument could be made with respect to Example I.2 (Injury in
the Hospital: Two Events, One Injury). In other circumstances, and under similar
assumptions, aggregation may lead to underdeterrence. Imagine that in the prior example,
the second doctor is informed in real time that the probability of the allegation against the
first doctor is slightly more than 50%. The second doctor (or the hospital) might take
deficient precautions to prevent a second injury for the same patient, knowing that only a
very high-probability allegation with respect to such a second injury would allow him any
additional recovery for it. (To illustrate, if the probability of the patient’s allegation relating
to the first injury is 51%, in order to recover for both the first and second injury, the patient
should be able to prove his allegations with respect to the second injury with a probability
close to 100%.)
Under a negligence rule, overdeterrence would arguably not result if the standard of care
were set accurately, the injurer could observe it, and the courts could accurately enforce it,
even if the injurer pays damages higher than the harm caused by his negligence. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 218-19 (6th ed. 2012) (arguing that a small
change in the damages awarded to the victim will not cause the injurer’s behavior to
change).
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plaintiff will be able to establish using statistical evidence is lower or higher
than 50%.27 In other types of cases the injurer may just know that it would be
hard for the victim to collect evidence—statistical or case-specific—to prove his
case, so he can predict that the probabilities of any allegations of injury would
be low.
Lastly, there are cases where aggregation can lead to more liability, but
never less. These are the cases where two (or more) alternative claims are made
regarding a single injury, rather than two separate injuries. Examples I.1 (The
Inherently Dangerous Vehicle) and I.2 (Injury in the Hospital: Two Events,
One Injury) belong to this category. No aggregation in this context typically
leads to underdeterrence, because in some cases injurers escape liability even if
it is more probable than not that they wrongfully inflicted harm on the
defendant. Aggregation can help to correct this underdeterrence.
In all of the examples discussed so far, aggregation of claims would not be
necessary if courts allowed probabilistic recoveries. Under a probabilistic
recovery rule (PRR), a defendant’s liability is the amount of the harm done to
the plaintiff multiplied by the probability that the harm was wrongfully caused
by the defendant. Only some jurisdictions allow PRR, and even when they
allow it, PRR applies in very limited contexts (mostly in cases of lost chances of
recovery28) and only when causation—but not wrongfulness—is uncertain.29
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of PRR. But some brief comments are in order. There are some
clear limits to PRR compared to aggregation. First, when the remedy cannot be
prorated, as with injunctions, PRR is inapplicable, while aggregation applies
more broadly.30 Second, to apply PRR, courts need accurate information about

27.

28.

29.

30.

For a discussion of medical malpractice cases where the typical probabilities of causation are
low and underdeterrence may result, see Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J.
82, 108-14 (2011).
See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Wash.
1983) (holding that a fourteen percentage-point reduction, from 39% to 25%, in the
decedent’s chance for survival was sufficient evidence to allow the case to go to the jury);
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1394-95 (1981) (endorsing
the application of a probabilistic rule to lost-chance-of-recovery cases); see also Doll v.
Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting the use of a probabilistic rule to
calculate damages for the lost chance to be promoted).
See generally ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 57-83 (2001)
(discussing the pros and cons of probabilistic recovery in different contexts, including cases
where wrongfulness is uncertain).
To be fair, tailoring a remedy under aggregation could sometimes be complex. Thus, in
Example I.3 (Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries), as we have explained, there
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the probability that the defendant wronged the plaintiff. That could often
make adjudication costly, which is probably one of the reasons why PRR is so
rare in the law. This is not the case with aggregation. To aggregate claims,
courts do not need to calculate exact probabilities; they only need to determine
whether aggregation makes it more probable than not that the defendant
wronged the plaintiff (or that a defense applies). Third, corrective justice
theorists resist PRR because it can make the defendant compensate the plaintiff
even though it is not more probable than not that he has wronged him. Other
theorists not belonging to the corrective justice school could raise the related
concern that the machinery of the law should not be put in motion against a
defendant until it is more probable than not that the plaintiff is entitled to a
remedy. In contrast, with aggregation, the defendant pays damages (or is
subject to other remedies) only when it is more probable than not that he
wronged the plaintiff.31 Aggregation would therefore be easier to accept for
many who resist PRR.32
At the same time, PRR holds several advantages over aggregation. In
particular, PRR works more systematically and accurately than aggregation
because it is applied to each claim separately and calibrates damages accurately.
Also, possible strategic behavior by injurers trying to avoid future aggregation
of low probability claims against them under an aggregation rule would not
take place under PRR.
The last example in this Section, which was first analyzed by Saul
Levmore,33 addresses a case where factual aggregation occurs within a claim
but across elements—which we call cross-element factual aggregation. Such
aggregation typically leads to less rather than more liability.34

31.

32.
33.
34.
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are several possible awards of damages under an aggregation rule, and it is often hard to
know how to choose among them. For further discussion of the aggregation of disparate
monetary awards, see infra Subsection V.C.3. Also, there could be situations where the
plaintiff seeks to aggregate claims for two different types of relief, like damages and an
injunction. Tailoring an aggregated remedy in such a case could be especially complex. See
infra Subsection V.C.3.
The alternative liability rule is a narrow exception, as it permits liability where a defendant’s
wrongdoing, but not the causal link between that wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s injury, has
been established by the preponderance of the evidence. See supra notes 15-18 and
accompanying text.
For more on the relationship between corrective justice theory and aggregation, see infra
Subsection V.B.1.
Levmore, supra note 8, at 723, 725-28.
It could lead to more liability only if some elements were alternatives to one another. Id. at
726-29.
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Example I.4. Several Elements of One Claim (A). In support of his
negligence claim, the plaintiff argues that the defendant acted
negligently and that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s
injury. The probability that the defendant acted negligently is 60%, and
the probability that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s harm
is also 60%.
With no aggregation, the court would find the defendant liable, but with
aggregation, liability would not be imposed, assuming the probabilities are
independent. Specifically, aggregation would yield that the probability that the
defendant negligently caused the litigated harm is only 36%, short of the
preponderance-of-the-evidence threshold. Note that the aggregation problem
becomes more acute as the number of elements composing the claim rises.
Thus, if—in addition to the uncertainty with respect to negligence and
causation—there is also uncertainty with respect to the plaintiff’s harm, such
that each of the three elements is proven with a probability of 60%,
aggregation would yield a probability of 21.6% that the defendant negligently
caused the litigated harm.35 The law is not clear as to whether juries and judges
should engage in cross-element aggregation: in several jurisdictions, jury
instructions encourage such aggregation, while in other jurisdictions they
discourage it.36
Throughout this Section, we have assumed that the probabilities of the two
(or more) claims being valid are independent; that is, if one claim is valid, it
does not affect the probability of the other claim being valid. However, this
assumption does not cover all cases. Sometimes there is dependence between
the probabilities, and then aggregation becomes more complex.37 Thus, if the
defendant allegedly engaged in two separate wrongful acts that caused two
injuries (or injuries caused by two individuals for whom the defendant is
vicariously liable, as in Example I.3 (Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two

35.
36.

37.

0.63 = 0.216.
Levmore, supra note 8, at 752 n.58 (suggesting that no jurisdiction explicitly recognizes
cross-element factual aggregation); id. at 725, 741 (arguing that jury instructions tend to be
ambiguous in several states, implicitly allowing such aggregation); see also Ronald J. Allen &
Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 893, 897-902 (arguing that virtually no model jury instruction, state or federal,
endorses cross-element factual aggregation); Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right:
Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1199, 1204 (2001) (providing examples of jury instructions in several jurisdictions that call
for separate examination of the elements).
Cf. Levmore, supra note 8, at 726-28 (discussing the dependence problem mainly in cases
similar to our Example I.4).
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Injuries)), the invalidity of the claim that the defendant negligently caused the
first injury could decrease the probability of the validity of the claim that the
defendant negligently caused the second injury, and vice versa. This
complication, however, does not necessarily preclude aggregation.
To illustrate, assume that claim A’s probability standing alone is 40%, and
claim B’s probability standing alone is also 40%. Assume now that the
probabilities of the two claims are somewhat dependent: if claim A is invalid,
the probability of claim B being valid is only 20%. With no aggregation, both
claims will be dismissed since a 40% probability (and certainly a 20%
probability) is not enough to establish liability. With aggregation, however,
some degree of liability would be imposed, since the probability that at least
one claim holds is greater than 50%.38 Because the probabilities of the two
claims are dependent, the probability that at least one claim is valid is less than
64%, which would have been the result of aggregation if both claims (with
40% probability) had been independent. In the extreme case, the dependence
between the probabilities of the two claims is full, which means that if claim A
is invalid, claim B is also invalid and vice versa. With full dependence,
aggregation becomes meaningless, since the probability that claim A (or claim
B) holds is the same as the probability that at least one of those claims holds.39
B. Normative Aggregation and Mixed Aggregation
Consider the following example:
Example I.5. Insanity and Mitigation: Two “Almost Defenses.” The
defendant hit the plaintiff while driving his car at an unreasonable
speed. The plaintiff was injured and later chose not to undergo an
essential surgery that would have cured him completely. The plaintiff
sues the defendant for negligently causing him the injury. The
defendant raises two defenses: insanity on his part and failure to
mitigate damages on the plaintiff’s part. The court concludes that even
though the defendant suffered from severe mental instability at the

38.

39.
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The probability of claim A being invalid is 0.6, and the probability of claim B being invalid,
conditional on the invalidity of claim A, is 0.8. Therefore, the probability of both claims
being invalid is 0.6 * 0.8 = 0.48, and the probability of at least one claim being valid is
1 - 0.48 = 0.52.
Notice that updating the probabilities of claims A and B due to their dependence is not
aggregation in our terms. With aggregation, the probabilities of the two claims are not
changed; instead, aggregation derives the probability that at least one of the two claims is
valid. For further elaboration on this distinction, see infra notes 101-102 and accompanying
text.
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time of the accident, his mental capacity had not been diminished to the
point where the insanity defense applies.40 The court also concludes
that even though the plaintiff’s failure to undergo the surgery was
unreasonable for most people, the mitigation-of-damages defense does
not apply, since tort law tolerates people’s resistance to undergoing
surgery.41
The court deciding the case would not aggregate the two defenses raised by
the defendant, and would reject both of them.42 We might criticize this stance
by pointing out that a defendant with both “almost defenses” may seem less
blameworthy than a defendant with only one. In a metaphoric way, we could
say that a defendant whose justifications or excuses for wrongdoing reach a
point of normative weight denoted as a should not face liability. That point can
be reached with a single viable defense that provides the normative weight of a,
but also by the accumulative normative weight of two “almost defenses”
(assuming, for example, that the normative weight of each of the “almost
defenses” is ½ a or more).43 Consider this argument from an economic
perspective. We sometimes do not impose liability on mentally incompetent
people because they are undeterrable, and we deny damages to plaintiffs who
fail to mitigate in order to give them an incentive to mitigate. But we may also
want to deny damages where the barely mentally competent person will be
only barely responsive to them and the surgery-fearing victim will be

40.

41.

42.

43.

The insanity defense is quite limited under American tort law. See DOBBS, supra note 9,
§ 120 (stating that the general rule is that the mentally disabled are liable for negligence,
subject to limited exceptions); cf. Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis.
1970) (deciding that when a person commits an act as a result of a sudden onset of
unforeseeable insanity comparable in its effect to certain physical impairments, liability will
not be imposed).
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 448 (1999) (noting that a plaintiff “should, and typically
does, operate within a domain of reasonable choice that spares her from having to make
unwanted life choices solely to minimize . . . [a defendant’s] financial losses”).
In Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Railways, 187 P. 2 (Cal. 1920), the plaintiff
sustained physical injury when she exited the defendant’s streetcar. Id. at 3. The defendant
argued both that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that she failed to mitigate
damages by choosing an improper physician. Id. at 5. The trial court instructed the jury that
the contributory negligence defense should be rejected unless it had been proved by the
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 6. The jury denied both defenses. Had the court
instructed the jury to aggregate the claims, either factually or normatively, the jury might
have reached a different decision.
Notice that this argument holds even if one of the defenses raised by the defendant does not
exist in the legal system at all: thus, even if an insanity defense is absent from a certain legal
system, an argument can be made that the defendant’s insanity coupled with an additional
“almost defense” could be sufficient to exempt the defendant from liability.
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somewhat responsive to the absence of them, because their joint response may
well be optimal if damages are not awarded. At the margin, the driver’s
incentives will be less affected if damages are awarded than the victim’s
incentives will be if damages are denied.
One possible solution is to aggregate the two “almost defenses” and release
the defendant from liability for the harms that would have been avoided if the
plaintiff had undergone the surgery. Like an aggregated damages award that
grants a plaintiff the lesser of two remedies, this aggregated defense would
afford the defendant the lesser of two reprieves from liability.44 By doing so,
the court would acknowledge that even if none of the defenses standing alone
should apply, the cumulative weight of the two “almost defenses” is sufficient
to justify a reduction of liability.
As we have said, courts would probably not allow aggregation in Example
I.5. They might, however, be more receptive to aggregation arguments when
facing two defense arguments based on similar normative grounds, such that
the defenses interrelate with each other. Thus, if a defendant raises the
defenses of self-defense and insanity in tandem, arguing that the somewhat
excessive force she used to defend herself was caused by her deficient mental
capacity at the time of the injury, the justification to aggregate the two “almost
defenses” might make more sense to some courts.45
However, courts should be cautious with cross-claim normative
aggregation, because the weight of an “almost defense,” or an “almost claim,”
could be zero, and then there would be nothing to aggregate. For example,

44.

45.
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A successful mitigation defense would have excused the defendant from liability for the
harms that surgery would have prevented, while a successful insanity defense would have
excused the defendant from all liability.
For an example from criminal law, consider State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004), where the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of her
husband, and subsequently brought a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 1135. The defendant claimed that her trial counsel had erred by failing to
present evidence of, or a defense based on, the defendant’s alleged battered spouse
syndrome. Id. The court agreed and ordered a new trial. A state appellate court affirmed that
decision, concluding that the defendant’s trial counsel should have introduced evidence of
battered spouse syndrome to support a claim of imperfect self-defense, which could have
mitigated the defendant’s liability. Id. at 1154. The court’s holding could be given two related
interpretations: (1) it implicitly aggregated the two “almost” defenses of battered spouse
syndrome and self-defense; or (2) it recognized in the imperfect self-defense doctrine an
aggregation of the concerns underlying the defenses of self-defense and battered spouse
syndrome. Under this second interpretation, the imperfect self-defense doctrine would itself
embody a type of aggregation. We later argue that the unconscionability doctrine in contract
law and several doctrines in constitutional law embody aggregation in a similar way. See
infra notes 72-75, 129-137 and accompanying text.
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suppose a driver hits a pedestrian and then subsequently crashes into the
pedestrian’s house. A court holds that each act was almost but not quite
negligent—in both cases, the cost of precaution would have been (barely) more
than the expected harm. When the claims are aggregated, it remains the case
that the defendant should not be held negligent—because the joint cost of
precaution would have been greater than the joint expected harm.
That conclusion might change if we adopted a different theory of
negligence. If, for example, we believe that there is some moral blame in causing
harm nonnegligently, but that the level of blame by itself is not enough to justify
the law’s intervention, then we might believe that intervention is warranted once
there is more than one injury caused by the same defendant to the same plaintiff
(or maybe even to different plaintiffs). From such a theory of torts, one could
develop a possible justification for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities:
even if an injurer’s activity is efficient, the high intensity of creating risks to
victims is a justification for imposing liability on him.46
Cross-claim normative aggregation can explain a puzzling legal rule: the
common law duty to rescue someone whom you have (even nonnegligently)
placed in danger. Thus, a person who nonnegligently shot her gun in the forest
and hit the plaintiff, causing him to fall into a pool of water, must take
reasonable measures to rescue him, even though other people do not have such
a duty.47 Tort theorists have struggled to justify this rule, given that,
independently, nonnegligently causing harm and nonrescue do not give rise to
tort liability. Isn’t it true that nil plus nil is still nil?48 A possible explanation is
that tort law aggregates two claims, each of which has some normative weight
but neither of which is alone sufficient to justify liability, so that once those

46.

47.

48.

Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 193, 203-19 (2000) (arguing that when an activity creates risks that are
concentrated on a few individuals, imposing liability for the creation of those risks is often
justified by fairness considerations even if the creation of those risks is reasonable).
See Maladona v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 629 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (deciding
that when the defendant creates the danger, even if with no fault, he has a duty to rescue
even if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent); DOBBS, supra note 9, § 316 (arguing that
an exception to the no-duty-to-rescue principle applies when the defendant who failed to
rescue caused the harm or created a risk to the plaintiff, even if innocently and without
fault); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 291 (giving an example of a car that blocks the
highway without fault and explaining that the driver still has the responsibility to warn
other drivers of the danger).
See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 193 (1973) (noting
this problem and arguing that judges dislike the outcome of no liability in such cases, which
explains this otherwise-unexplained exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule). Following
Epstein’s logic, one could make the argument that the creation of the exception is the result
of implicit normative aggregation.
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two claims are aggregated, liability is justified. In particular, nonnegligently
causing harm is not sufficient to justify liability, and failing to rescue is not
sufficient to justify liability, but nonnegligently causing harm followed by a
failure to rescue may nevertheless justify liability.49
If cross-claim factual aggregations and cross-claim normative aggregations
were recognized, the door would be open for mixed aggregations. The next
example, which is a variation of Example I.5, illustrates the potential for mixed
aggregations.
Example I.6. Insanity and Mitigation: An Uncertain Defense with a Certain
“Almost Defense.” Same facts as in Example I.5, except that there is
factual uncertainty rather than normative insufficiency as to the
application of the insanity defense. The probability that the defense
applies is 40%.
With no aggregation, the court would reject the insanity defense in
Example I.6, since the defendant failed to establish that defense by the
preponderance of the evidence. The court would also reject the failure-tomitigate defense, since the failure of the plaintiff to undergo surgery, even if
considered unreasonable by most people, does not trigger the application of the
defense.50 Conversely, by aggregating the defenses, the court would conclude
that some reduction in liability is appropriate. The court might then accept the

49.

50.
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This is not the only possible explanation, of course. See EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 291
(arguing that in cases where the defendant caused the injury with no fault, it becomes easier
to identify the one who could have rescued the plaintiff); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 125-26 (1978) (arguing that when the risk is increased by the
actor, the risk of error in establishing causation between the omission and the injury is
reduced); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty To Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 257-58 (1980)
(asserting that the increase in the probability of an accident diminishes the ability of the
victim and others to abate it, and therefore the defendant “must account for the increased
risk”).
In Davenport v. F.B. Dubach Lumber Co., 36 So. 812 (La. 1904), the plaintiff, the defendant’s
employee, was run over by a locomotive and sustained severe injuries. Id. at 812. The
defendant argued in its defense that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that
while being hospitalized he signed a compromise agreement with the defendant, releasing it
from liability. Id. at 813-14. The plaintiff argued that he was not contributorily negligent and
that when he signed the compromise agreement he was under the influence of drugs. Id.
The court denied the defenses and decided for the plaintiff. From the facts in the court
decision, it seems that there was some factual uncertainty as to the applicability of the
contributory negligence defense. Id. If the defense relating to the release agreement was
“almost” applicable, a mixed aggregation could have brought the court to a different
decision.
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lesser of the two independent defenses, exonerating the defendant from
liability for the harm the plaintiff could have mitigated if she had undergone
the surgery.51
Finally, a cross-element normative aggregation could be an interesting option
to consider. Under this type of aggregation, when one element of a cause of
action is more than satisfied, it could sometimes compensate for another element
of the same cause of action that is not quite satisfied. Consider a variation of
Example I.4:
Example I.7. Several Elements of One Claim (B). The plaintiff argues that
the defendant was negligent and that the defendant’s negligence is the
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The defendant admits his negligence, but
argues that the plaintiff suffers only stand-alone emotional harm, and
therefore liability should not be imposed.
If the harm is indeed stand-alone emotional harm, then under current law,
liability would most likely not be imposed: without an accompanying physical
injury, courts usually consider the element of “harm” lacking. But crosselement normative aggregation could change the outcome. Assume that the
defendant was not “just” negligent but grossly negligent, so that the element of
“negligence” is more than satisfied. The defendant’s gross negligence could
compensate for the fact that the plaintiff suffers only stand-alone emotional
harm, and could justify the imposition of liability. This type of aggregation
would arguably comport with the goals of tort law. Courts may hesitate to
impose liability for negligent infliction of stand-alone emotional harm because,
in cases of ordinary negligence, such liability would lead to overdeterrence of
injurers and unjustified litigation costs. Both concerns seem less compelling
when the injurer’s degree of fault is especially high. This way of reasoning

51.

As with factual aggregation, the probabilistic recovery rule, or a version of it, could be
applied in normative aggregation cases, making aggregation unnecessary. But as we have
explained, there are several clear advantages to aggregation over the probabilistic recovery
rule. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. Furthermore, quantifying what percentage of
a normative threshold each “almost claim” reaches—which would be necessary for applying
a probabilistic recovery rule to normative aggregation cases—would be a different, and more
foreign, task for courts than calculating probabilities of particular factual allegations. For a
recent discussion of the related topic of the either-or character of the law, as opposed to
probabilistic or other intermediate approaches, see LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE
139-81 (2011), which also cites the main sources in the literature.
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could explain why liability for stand-alone emotional harm is imposed under
current law if the behavior of the defendant was outrageous.52
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
Should tort law allow cross-person aggregation? Take the following
example:
Example I.8. Mass Torts: Indeterminate Plaintiffs. The defendant’s factory
wrongfully emits radiation which causes an increase in the frequency of
a fatal cancer in the population; instead of 100 people contracting the
disease every year, now 125 people contract it every year. Because of a
lack of scientific knowledge, it is impossible to identify those 25 victims
whose disease was caused by the radiation. All 125 people bring suits
against the defendant.53
Under traditional causation principles, all suits would be dismissed because
none of the plaintiffs can establish by the preponderance of the evidence that
her disease was caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing. The plaintiffs can
establish, however, that the wrongdoing caused harm to 25 out of the 125
plaintiffs. By aggregating all claims, the court could impose liability on the
defendant for 20% of the total harm suffered by all plaintiffs, and could then
distribute the damages among them.
Notice that the aggregation of all claims in Example I.8 mimics the
defendant’s liability if there were no uncertainty about which plaintiffs had
been harmed by the radiation, but does not mimic the plaintiffs’ entitlements if
there were no uncertainty. Without uncertainty, the defendant would also have
paid about 20% of the total harm, but those damages would have gone to 25
rather than 125 plaintiffs.
Market share liability, in contrast, mimics both defendants’ liability and
plaintiffs’ entitlements as if there were no factual uncertainty. In the notorious
diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases, numerous manufacturers produced the same

52.

53.
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See DOBBS, supra note 9, §§ 302-04 (discussing the rule against liability for stand-alone
emotional harm and its exceptions, principally where a defendant intentionally inflicted
emotional distress).
For a well-known case presenting a similar problem, and in which a settlement was reached,
see In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). Veterans brought suits against manufacturers of “Agent Orange”
for injuries allegedly caused by their exposure to that chemical, which was used by U.S.
military forces in the Vietnam War. Id. at 746-47. Many of the plaintiffs’ injuries could have
been attributed either to their exposure to Agent Orange or to other causes. Id. at 777.
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generic drug for preventing miscarriage. Many years later, the drug was found
to be defective and harmful to the daughters of the women who had taken the
drug.54 Plaintiffs, however, found it impossible to prove the identity of the
specific manufacturer that had produced the specific drug taken by their
mothers many years earlier.55 For some time, courts had refused to impose
liability on manufacturers, since the probability that a specific manufacturer
had actually caused the litigated harm in any given case was much lower than
50%.56 In 1980, however, the California Supreme Court established the market
share liability doctrine, whereby all manufacturers were held liable toward
plaintiffs in accordance with their market share at the time a plaintiff’s mother
took the drug.57 Under market share liability, when all suits are completed,
manufacturers should bear liability in the amount of the actual harm they
wrongfully caused and plaintiffs should receive damages in the amount of the
harms they suffered from wrongdoing. Thus, market share liability aims at
mimicking the world without uncertainty.
So far, we have illustrated cross-person aggregation under factual
uncertainty. Thus, the cross-person aggregation discussed so far is an
extension of the cross-claim factual aggregation discussed above in Section I.A.
But cross-person aggregation can also extend to the cross-claim normative
aggregation and cross-claim mixed aggregation discussed in Section I.B.
In United States v. Hatahley,58 Native Americans brought suit against the
U.S. government for trespass, arguing that their horses and burros were
unlawfully rounded up by the government’s agents and later sold to a horsemeat plant and a glue factory. Among other things, they sued for mental pain
and suffering. The district court awarded them damages for mental pain and
suffering under a theory that the emotional harm they suffered was “a
community loss and a community sorrow shared by all.”59 That theory allowed

54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.

See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
See id. at 928.
See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733-35 (Ct. App. 1978) (denying
liability of diethylstilbestrol (DES) producers and ruling that recovery for injuries resulting
from a defective product requires that the plaintiff identify the manufacturer and establish
the causal relation between the injury and the product).
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937-38. The court defined the relevant “market” as sales of DES for the
prevention of miscarriage. Id.
257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 925 n.5 (quoting the district court opinion). The district court further explained, as
quoted by the appellate court:
It is not possible for the extent of the mental pain and suffering to be separately
evaluated as to each individual plaintiff. It is evident that each and all of the
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the court to be generous to the plaintiffs and award them relatively high
damages. The appellate court rejected the district court’s theory, maintaining
that “pain and suffering is a personal and individual matter, not a common
injury, and must so be treated.”60 Using our terminology, the district court
arguably allowed a kind of cross-person normative aggregation, perhaps under
the assumption that the aggregate harm across persons exceeded a normative
threshold even if the harm caused to any particular person did not.61
ii. contract law
A. Factual Aggregation
Contract law, like tort law, appears to permit factual aggregation within
elements,62 but it does not generally permit cross-claim factual aggregation.
Example II.1. Either Material Breach or Fraudulent Misrepresentation. The
plaintiff can prove with 40% probability that the defendant engaged in
a material breach of a contract, and also can prove with 40% probability
that the defendant engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation. Under
either theory, the plaintiff would be entitled to rescission of the
contract.
Although the probability that at least one claim is valid is 64%, the plaintiff
would lose because courts do not permit cross-claim factual aggregation.63

plaintiffs sustained mental pain and suffering. Nor is it possible to say that the
plaintiff who lost one or two horses sustained less mental pain and suffering than
plaintiffs who lost a dozen horses.
60.
61.

62.

63.
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Id.
Id. at 925. The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial as to damages. Id. at
926.
Alternatively, the district court’s claim that “[i]t is not possible for the extent of the mental
pain and suffering to be separately evaluated as to each individual plaintiff,” id. at 925 n.5
(quoting district court opinion), might suggest that the district court engaged in crossperson factual aggregation. Perhaps separate evaluations were not possible because mental
pain and suffering could not be demonstrated with sufficient certainty on an individual
basis. It is also possible that both cross-person normative aggregation and cross-person
factual aggregation played a role at the same time, which may imply that the district court
decision exhibited cross-person mixed aggregation.
We have not found any cases that clearly recognize (or reject) within-element factual
aggregation in contract law, but we would be surprised if there were a major difference
between the way contract law and tort law address such aggregation.
Or so we believe. We have not found any cases suggesting otherwise.
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Long-term contracts or business relationships involving multiple contracts
can raise issues of cross-claim factual aggregation. In such cases, a buyer might
bring a suit against a seller arguing that the seller breached the same contract
several times in the past, or breached several contracts in the past, and
therefore owes the buyer compensation. The buyer might fail, however, to
prove any specific breach by the preponderance of the evidence, so the court,
without aggregation, would dismiss the suit. By contrast, aggregation would
lead the court to award damages for one or several of the alleged breaches; or,
in the appropriate case, to endorse the buyer’s refusal to offer payments for
performance because of one, or more, of the alleged breaches. In awarding
relief for such aggregated wrongdoing, the court would not be able to point out
the exact breach that took place. Accordingly, like a court that aggregates tort
claims with different damages awards,64 the court here would have to choose
an alternative means of calculating liability. The court could, for example, craft
a remedy that averaged the alleged breaches. If the alleged breaches are similar
(say, five deliveries of the same number of widgets, with similar allegations of
breach), arithmetic averaging would be relatively easy. Factual discrepancies
between the alleged breaches, however, would render aggregation more
complex, and one could argue that aggregation should not be made by
averaging where the breaches differ substantially. In such cases, the court could
still aggregate by acknowledging, at a minimum, that the least severe breach
took place and allowing a remedy for it.
Parties to contracts, unlike tort victims and wrongdoers, can address
aggregation directly by providing in their contracts that the court should
aggregate facts. As far as we are aware, parties do not do so.65 That raises the
question whether cross-claim factual aggregation is actually a desirable
approach. It may be that parties do not provide for cross-claim factual
aggregation because it would not improve incentives. Although cross-claim
factual aggregation leads to more accurate decisions ex post, it would not
improve incentives if the too-high and too-low liability outcomes, which
aggregation would correct, cancel out ex ante.66

64.
65.

66.

See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing analogous remedial challenges with
respect to Example I.3 (Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries)).
At least not explicitly. It is possible, however, that parties do open the door for aggregation
in more subtle ways. For instance, contracts often call for cooperation, such as best efforts or
good faith—relatively amorphous standards to which several distinct acts might be relevant.
Contracts also often create mechanisms for the resolution of disagreements by nonlawyer
arbiters who need not provide rigorous and formal reasoning for their decisions. Those
standards and mechanisms could be used for implicit aggregations.
See supra p. 15 (discussing cases in which aggregation in tort would not change a potential
injurer’s incentives).
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To illustrate, assume that the parties anticipate, when making their
contract, that there could be two allegations of two separate breaches by the
promisee, where in each case the harm would be 100 and the probability of
each breach would be either 40% or 60% for both breaches (with equal
probabilities). With no aggregation the promisor’s expected liability if the two
allegations are made is 100: there is a 50% likelihood that the probability is
40% and he pays zero, and a 50% likelihood that the probability is 60% and he
pays 200. But the promisor’s expected liability is also 100 with aggregation. If
courts aggregate, there is still a 50% likelihood that the probability is 40%, but
now the promisor would pay 100, because there is a probability of 64% that he
committed at least one of the two breaches. There is also a 50% likelihood that
the probability is 60%, but now the promisor would pay 100 here as well,
because there is a probability of 84% that he committed at least one of the two
breaches, but a probability of only 36% that he committed both. Once expected
liability with or without aggregation is the same, the parties’ incentives are the
same as well.67
If, however, the parties to the contract anticipate rescission as the remedy,
and the two alleged breaches are material (or there is an alleged material breach
and an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, as in Example II.1), aggregation
could only increase the promisor’s ability to rescind the contract, and never
decrease it.68 That would generally improve the parties’ incentives by
correcting underdeterrence, because the promisee would be able to rescind the
contract whenever it is more probable than not that the promisor materially
breached it (or, in Example II.1, either materially breached the contract or
engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation, or did both).
B. Normative Aggregation
Contract law does not directly permit cross-claim normative aggregation of
the following type:
Example II.2. Non-Material Breach and Misleading Conduct. The
defendant engages in misleading conduct that falls short of fraudulent

67.

68.
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Under certain conditions, aggregation could lead to less liability than no aggregation. That
does not change, in substance, the arguments favoring aggregation. See supra notes 22-24
and accompanying text (addressing this issue in the tort context). Also, aggregation could
sometimes, under certain assumptions, lead to either overinvestment or underinvestment in
precautions in preventing the second breach. See supra note 25 and accompanying text
(addressing analogous tort issue).
See supra p. 17 (making an analogous point regarding tort cases involving two alternative
claims stemming from a single injury).
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misrepresentation in order to secure the plaintiff’s consent to a contract.
Subsequently, the defendant engages in a breach that falls just short of
material. The plaintiff seeks to rescind the contract based on claims of
fraudulent misrepresentation and material breach.
A court would typically not approve the rescission in Example II.2.69 The
plaintiff would lose on the first claim because the defendant’s misleading
conduct at the time of contract formation would fall short of fraudulent
misrepresentation, and on the second claim because the breach is not material.
Therefore, the court would decide that the plaintiff, by unlawfully rescinding
the contract, breached the contract himself. By contrast, cross-claim normative
aggregation would permit the plaintiff to claim that he was entitled to rescind
the contract on the basis of both the fraudulent misrepresentation and the
breach, even though neither of them standing alone was sufficient for
rescission.
Yet contract law often seems to permit cross-element normative
aggregation, a notable distinction from how tort law approaches aggregation.
Consider the following example:
Example II.3. Two Minor Breaches. The defendant promises to build a
house for the plaintiff. When the time for the first progress payment
comes around, the defendant is a little behind in schedule and has made
some minor mistakes in construction. The plaintiff claims that the
defendant has breached the contract.
Even though each of the two breaches might not be regarded as substantial
individually, a court could find them collectively substantial, justifying
rescission on the part of the plaintiff. Courts often perform this type of
normative aggregation to find contractual breach.70 Essentially, each individual

69.

70.

At least not expressly. Courts sometimes permit considerations from one claim (or defense)
to bleed over to another. For example, in Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Edwards, 45 F. Supp. 2d
722, 746-51 (D. Neb. 1999), a court found that the plaintiff had entered into a contract under
duress in part because the defendant had also committed fraud by lying about the contents
of the contract.
See SunTrust Mortg., Inc. v. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 2d 872, 902
n.64 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Precedent shows that, in assessing the materiality of multiple
breaches, as the Court must do here, it is appropriate to consider the combined—or
‘cumulative’—effect of the breaches.”); see also Seven-Up Bottling Co. (Bangkok) v. PepsiCo
Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that the plaintiff’s multiple
breaches “with respect to minimum sales and distribution requirements” collectively
constituted “a breach of its further obligation . . . to adequately promote and develop the
market for [the defendant’s] products”).
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breach functions as an element of the plaintiff’s overarching claim that the
defendant has violated the contract to the point of justifying rescission.71
Consider another example, which shows the evolution of contract law to
endorse a similar type of normative aggregation:
Example II.4. Unconscionability. A store sells a TV set on credit to a poor
customer. The customer is not well educated and does not read the
contract, which provides that the store may repossess all of the goods
that the customer bought previously from the store on credit if they are
not yet fully paid for and the customer defaults on payments for the TV
set.
Under older doctrine, if the customer defaulted and lost all goods
previously purchased, she would not have a remedy. If she sued under the
mistake doctrine, she would lose because she did not read the contract. If she
sued on the grounds that she was uneducated, she would lose because although
courts recognize incompetence or undue influence as grounds for rescission,
they generally treat lack of education as falling short of incompetence or undue
influence.72 But over the last half century, the doctrine of unconscionability
evolved.73 Under this doctrine, a plaintiff can invoke considerations jointly—
like failure to read the contract and lack of education—that can be considered
only individually under other doctrines. In this way, the unconscionability

71.

72.

73.
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Courts have also arguably treated individual breaches as elements of the claim that a
defendant violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and have aggregated those
breaches to impose liability. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 72730 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that multiple breaches by a franchisor amounted to a violation of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and even a possible tort claim justifying punitive
damages under Indiana law).
See, e.g., Mason v. Acceptance Loan Co., 850 So. 2d 289, 296, 302 n.9 (Ala. 2002)
(“The plaintiffs also argue that their poor reading skills and lack of education, and the
defendants’ alleged knowledge of those limitations, render the arbitration agreement
unconscionable. However . . . we have repeatedly held to the contrary.”).
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (recognizing
unconscionability to include an absence of meaningful choice caused by the inequality of
bargaining power when one of the parties is uneducated and signed the contract without full
knowledge of its terms); see also U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2010) (“If the court as a matter of law
finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”). See generally E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 307-16 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the unconscionability
doctrine); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 151-77
(2000) (same).
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doctrine can be understood as permitting a kind of cross-element normative
aggregation. Unconscionability is the claim, and issues like the plaintiff’s
failure to read and lack of education become elements of that claim. But it is
important to see that the cross-claim normative aggregation is implicit in the
design of the unconscionability cause of action: courts do not say that plaintiffs
can prevail by presenting colorable claims under two doctrines, but the
unconscionability doctrine has the same effect.74
As this example shows, courts may address concerns about aggregation
through doctrinal evolution. Broader standards subsume narrower rules as
courts realize that cases can fall between the rules even though the cases raise
the concerns that justify those rules. But as the doctrine becomes broader and
permits greater aggregation, critics complain that the law becomes too vague
and can no longer guide behavior.75 We will return to this problem in Part V.
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
As with torts, there are cases in contracts where plaintiffs cannot prevail
against a specific defendant because of inherent difficulties of proof. These
cases raise questions about whether cross-person aggregation should be
allowed. The next example illustrates such a case.
Example II.5. Many Unproven Breaches with Customers. The defendant
ships goods by sea, and the plaintiffs are the defendant’s customers
whose goods were damaged. In most cases there is evidence indicating
that the damage could be the result of a breach of contract by the
defendant, but that evidence is not strong enough to establish liability
in any one plaintiff’s suit.

74.

75.

A similar point can be made about the doctrine of undue influence as applied in Odorizzi v.
Bloomfield School District, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). In that case, the plaintiff
sought rescission of his resignation from the defendant employer under several theories,
including “duress, menace, fraud,” “mistake,” and “undue influence.” Id. at 538. The district
court sustained the defendant’s demurrer regarding all of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. While the
appellate court also rejected his independent duress, menace, fraud, and mistake claims, it
concluded that the plaintiff had stated a claim for undue influence. Id. at 539-43. In reaching
this conclusion, the court arguably took into account and aggregated factors relevant to the
other claims it had denied. Id.
For this criticism of the unconscionability doctrine, see, for example, Evelyn L. Brown, The
Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J.
287, 288 (2000), which argues that the unconscionability doctrine allows courts such “wide
latitude” that they often “manipulate the unconscionability principle in order to reach the
equitable results they desire.”
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The court in Example II.5 would reject all suits brought independently by
individual plaintiffs because those plaintiffs would not be able to establish
liability. Prevailing law would also not allow recovery even if the plaintiffs
brought a class action, since any named plaintiff would still need to establish
his or her individual injury.76
That result would change if courts were willing to aggregate all claims and
allow full recovery in some of the cases, or partial (probabilistic) recovery in all
of the cases. We speculate that the argument for aggregation would seem more
compelling for courts if a breach were already established by the preponderance
of the evidence, and only causation could not be proven without aggregation,
than if the breach itself could not be proven without aggregation. As the
development of the alternative liability rule demonstrates, courts applying tort
law have been more generous to plaintiffs on the issue of causation when those
plaintiffs have persuasively established a defendant’s wrongdoing.77 Under the
alternative liability rule, once a plaintiff proves that a defendant acted
wrongfully, courts are willing to place the risk of error regarding causation on
the defendant.78 We suspect that courts applying contract law would have a
similar impulse, and so would more readily allow aggregation to establish
causation when a plaintiff had already proven the defendant’s breach without
aggregation.
iii. criminal law
A. Factual Aggregation
Aggregation in criminal law resembles aggregation in tort law but raises
special concerns because of sensitivities about the rights of the accused.79
Consider the following example:

76.

77.

78.
79.
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See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“[E]ven named
plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been
injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to
which they belong and which they purport to represent.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 502 (1975))).
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing the alternative liability rule). In
cases where courts allowed cross-person aggregation in tort law, defendants’ wrongdoing
had also already been established. See supra Section I.C.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining the “risk-of-error” logic behind the
alternative liability rule).
See Harel & Porat, supra note 8 (discussing factual aggregation in criminal law).
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Example III.1. Two Unproven Charges. The defendant is charged with
pickpocketing and rape, two unrelated offenses allegedly committed by
him at different times and places. The evidence suggests that the
probability that he committed each one of these offenses is 90%.
Assume that the required probability necessary to satisfy the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard is 95%.80
Under prevailing law, the defendant would be acquitted of both offenses.
Yet there is a 99% probability81 that he committed at least one offense, which is
higher than the 95% probability necessary for conviction in a criminal trial. If
instead the court engaged in cross-claim factual aggregation, it could convict
the defendant of one unspecified offense and impose on him, at a minimum,
the sanction of the less severe of the two offenses, pickpocketing.82 Example
III.1 raises a straightforward dilemma: individuals are routinely convicted for
committing a single offense on the basis of evidence that establishes guilt with
a lower probability (95% under our assumption) than the probability that the
defendant in Example III.1 committed at least one offense (99%). Arguably, it
is not just that the Example III.1 defendant is acquitted while, at the same time,
a defendant charged with a single offense that can be proven at a lower
probability (95% under our initial assumption) is convicted.
Example III.1 illustrates how cross-claim factual aggregation could result in
more convictions than with no aggregation. But aggregation could also result
in fewer convictions, as is illustrated in Example III.2.
Example III.2. Two Proven Charges. The defendant is charged with
pickpocketing and rape, two unrelated offenses, allegedly committed by
him in different times and places. The evidence suggests that the
probability that he committed each one of these offenses is 95%.
Assume that the required probability necessary to satisfy the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard is 95%.
Under prevailing law, the defendant would be convicted of both charges
because the probability that he committed each of the offenses (95%) is

80.
81.
82.

This example is borrowed from Harel and Porat, id. at 262.
The probability that the defendant committed at least one of the offenses is 1 - 0.12 = 0.99.
Cross-claim factual aggregation could also apply to affirmative defense claims in criminal
actions. For example, in Ralston v. State, 927 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished
memorandum decision), the defendant raised two defenses: that he did not cause the
victim’s injuries and that he acted in self-defense when he repeatedly punched the victim.
Each claim was considered separately by the jury and denied. Aggregating the two claims
might have brought a different result.
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sufficient for conviction. Yet, the probability that the defendant committed both
offenses is only 90%, which is lower than 95%.83 Therefore, with cross-claim
factual aggregation, the court would convict the defendant of only one offense:
while the probability that he committed at least one offense is greater than
95%, which is sufficient for conviction, the probability that he committed two
offenses is insufficient. The court would then need to decide which offense to
convict the defendant of. In our view, the correct decision would be to convict
the defendant only of the more severe offense, since the probability that he
committed that offense is 95%.84 However, it could well be appropriate for the
court to nudge the sentence for the more severe offense up a bit to reflect the
fact that there is a 90% probability that the defendant committed both
offenses.85
Cross-claim factual aggregation in cases illustrated by Example III.1 would
arguably improve deterrence (assuming, as we must, that the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard should be taken as fixed). Under current law, when
defendants are charged with several offenses, and the probability that they
committed at least one of those offenses is very high, they still often escape
conviction just because no specified offense can be attributed to them with
sufficient certainty. Those defendants could be considered underdeterred
under current law, and would then be better deterred with cross-claim factual
aggregation. In contrast, cross-claim factual aggregation in cases illustrated by
Example III.2 would reduce false convictions (that is, convictions of the
innocent). Under current law, defendants who are charged with several
offenses are often convicted of all of those offenses, even if the aggregated
probability that they committed all of them is too low to meet the beyond-areasonable-doubt threshold. With cross-claim factual aggregation, those
defendants will be convicted of fewer offenses, and many false convictions will
be avoided.86

83.
84.

85.

86.
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0.952 ≈ 0.90.
This is a critical distinction from Example III.1, where we recommended imposing the less
severe penalty as an aggregated remedy because the probability that the defendant deserved
the sentence for the more severe offense was lower than 95% (it was 90%).
Cf. Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833 (2012) (calling for
calibration of the sanctions imposed on defendants to the level of the uncertainty of their
guilt, and arguing for the relaxation of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in
appropriate cases).
Under certain conditions, reducing the number of false convictions by increasing the burden
of proof—the result of aggregation in cases illustrated by Example III.2—increases
deterrence since it increases the difference between the expected sanctions of the guilty and
innocent. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1263-64, 1277-80 (2001) (suggesting that the admission of certain
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Cross-claim factual aggregation in criminal law might be regarded as more
objectionable than in torts and contracts, because of the concern that it would
curtail the accused’s rights (although, as illustrated by Example III.2,
aggregation could also favor the accused). Allowing aggregation would require
changes in procedure that many would consider undesirable. In particular,
aggregation would require that the prosecution be allowed to bring several
charges of different natures against the accused at the same trial, since it is hard
to imagine that aggregation could take place if each charge were brought before
a different jury or judge.87 Aggregation could increase the burden on the
defense, since defending against several charges, even if each has a low
probability, could be harder and more costly than defending against one highprobability charge. Aggregation could also encourage abuse and strategic
behavior by the prosecution because it is typically easier—maybe too easy—to
bring many low-probability charges against the defendant than to bring one
high-probability charge against him. (From a different perspective, however,
bringing several low-probability charges together could reduce the expense of
criminal litigation by economizing on enforcement costs.)
Furthermore, prosecutors might strategically avoid bringing two highprobability charges together (as in Example III.2) if they believe that they have
enough evidence to establish guilt for each of the charges, out of fear that the
court would aggregate the probabilities and convict the defendant of only one
charge. This concern could be mitigated, however, if the accused were allowed
to force the prosecution to bring the two charges in a single trial.88
Finally, a more substantive objection to aggregation could be that it would
dilute the expressive function of criminal law. Thus, in Example III.1, with
aggregation, the accused would be convicted of being either a rapist or a
pickpocket, and his criminal record might literally list his offense as “rape or
larceny.” Some commentators may consider that outcome intolerable:
punishing a person for an offense that the person may or may not have
committed rather than for the offense that the person actually committed
dilutes the expressive, educational, and communicative messages of

87.

88.

types of propensity evidence might decrease deterrence by decreasing the difference between
the expected sanctions of the guilty and innocent).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that two offenses may be
joined in the same indictment if they “are of the same or similar character, or are based on
the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme
or plan.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). Under Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, courts may order separate trials if the joinder of offenses appears to prejudice a
defendant or the government. Id. R. 14(a).
See infra Subsection V.C.1.
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punishment. But, on the other hand, it is hard to see why acquittal of both
offenses would be preferable, even from an expressivist point of view.89
Cross-element aggregation is also an issue in criminal law.90 If several
elements of the same offense must be proven to establish the defendant’s guilt,
then cross-element aggregation could generate a different outcome than if each
element were considered separately. For instance, if convicting a person for
burglary requires both trespass and intent to commit a crime, it is possible that
even if each element of the offense (trespass and intent) can be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, reasonable doubt could still exist with respect to the
cumulative presence of the two elements. Will the court convict the defendant
under such circumstances? The answer is unclear.91 As in tort and contract law,
however, within-element factual aggregation is permissible and appears
routine.92
Cross-claim factual aggregation should be distinguished from two existing
doctrines in criminal law: the prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines.93 Under
both of these doctrines, past similar behavior on the part of the defendant can
be used as evidence supporting conviction.94 But these two doctrines, termed
the “pattern-of-behavior” doctrines, are distinct from the aggregation
discussed above. Whereas the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are based on the
probabilistic dependence of the offenses attributed to the defendant, the

89.
90.

91.

92.

93.
94.
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For more objections and responses, see Harel & Porat, supra note 8, at 291-309.
See Maya Bar-Hillel, Probabilistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 267,
268-70, 282-83 (1984) (analyzing the use of probabilities in cases and suggesting a “soft
role . . . for probability in the factfinding process”) (emphasis added). But see People v.
Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33, 40-41 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting the use of probabilities in determining
guilt on the facts of the case).
Compare Levmore, supra note 8, at 733 n.19 (suggesting that the defense might benefit from
a rule of aggregation when it reminds the jury of all the doubts that have been raised and
implies that, combined, they create more than a reasonable doubt), with Nash, supra note 8,
at 138-39 (discussing the rule of aggregation in the context of voting by judges in a panel or
by jurors and observing that “a criminal defendant cannot be convicted unless a jury
unanimously finds each element of the crime charged proven beyond a reasonable doubt”
(citation omitted)). Note that the Model Penal Code says that “[n]o person may be
convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1962). It thus seems that the Code rules out crosselement aggregation.
See Nash, supra note 8, at 138-39 (“[A] federal jury need not always decide unanimously
which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say,
which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.”
(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999))).
See FED. R. EVID. 404, 413, 414.
See id.
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aggregation we have discussed is most appropriately (but not only) applied
when those offenses are entirely independent of one another.
Under the prior-acts doctrine, which was adopted in Rule 404(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the prosecution can bring evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts that can be attributed to the defendant to establish “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.”95 Such prior acts cannot be used as propensity
evidence,96 however, and courts are required to instruct the jury accordingly.97
Interestingly, under Rule 404(b), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, even
conduct that has been the subject of a prior acquittal can be submitted as
evidence by the prosecution in a subsequent trial in order to support
conviction.98
The similar-crimes doctrine, adopted in Rules 413 and 414 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, applies to sexual assault and child molestation offenses.99
Under this doctrine, if the defendant is accused of one of these types of
offenses, “the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any
other” offense of the same type, and “[t]he evidence may be considered on any
matter to which it is relevant.”100
The superficial similarity between the pattern-of-behavior doctrines and
aggregation stems from their shared feature, namely, that all three consider the
past behavior of the defendant and affirm that past behavior can influence the

95.
96.
97.

98.

99.
100.

Id. R. 404(b)(2).
Id. R. 404(b)(1).
See, e.g., People v. Quinn, 486 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (“Where, however,
evidence of a defendant’s other wrongful acts has been admitted for the limited purposes
allowed under [Michigan Rules of Evidence] 404(b), the prosecutor deprives the defendant
of a fair trial in arguing that the jury should consider the evidence as substantive evidence of
the defendant’s guilt.”); see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689-92 (1988)
(holding that the prosecution can admit evidence of past acts under Rule 404(b) without
first establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed those
acts).
See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1990) (holding that testimony
tending to prove that the defendant had committed a crime, which had been brought in a
prior trial that ended in acquittal, was rightly admitted under Rule 404(b) by the court in a
subsequent trial because it established the defendant’s identity).
See FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
Id. Under Rule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this doctrine is also applicable to civil
cases involving sexual assault and child molestation. See Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen
Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates
the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 29 (1996) (“By requiring the admission of
propensity evidence, the rules prevent a fundamentally fair trial, and thus violate due
process . . . .”).
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likelihood of conviction.101 But, this resemblance notwithstanding, there is a
substantial difference between them. The pattern-of-behavior doctrines are
rooted in the premise that a person who has committed several offenses in the
past could be more likely to have either intended to commit or actually
committed the offense of which that person is presently accused. The
defendant’s past behavior thus modifies the probability of his guilt in the
current case. It is the dependence between the past offense and the present
alleged offense that provides the grounds for conviction. In contrast, crossclaim factual aggregation is based on the axiom that the probability that a
person committed at least one of two offenses (A or B) is greater than the
probability that she committed A and greater than the probability that she
committed B (unless there is full dependence between the two offenses). Crossclaim factual aggregation is not based on any dependence between the offenses
attributed to the defendant: in our examples, the probability that she committed
one offense does not change the probability that she committed another. Rather,
only the probability that she committed an unspecified offense is affected.102
B. Normative Aggregation
Normative aggregation could arise in criminal law in situations analogous
to tort law. Thus, like the tort defendant, the criminal defendant may raise two
defenses, neither of them sufficient to exonerate the defendant from liability.
However, the weight of those two “almost defenses” taken together may be
sufficient for acquittal, or at least for mitigation of liability. For example, the
defendant may raise both a factual mistake defense and self-defense. Suppose
that neither of the two defenses reaches the normative threshold where it
applies: the mistake was unreasonable (but nearly reasonable) and the

101.
102.
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As Example III.2 illustrates, sometimes aggregation would lead to acquittal rather than
conviction.
Note that under the prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines, the fact that a person
committed several similar offenses in the past increases the chances of conviction in the
present case. By contrast, under cross-claim factual aggregation, as illustrated by Example
III.2, if it were practical to apply aggregation in different trials—an issue we discuss at greater
length later, see infra Subsection V.C.2—the fact that a person was convicted of an offense in
the past in one trial would decrease the probability of conviction in a later offense in a
subsequent trial. Thus, if in Example III.2 the defendant were convicted of rape in a first
trial (because the probability of his guilt was 95%) and then charged with pickpocketing in a
subsequent trial, a court applying aggregation would acquit the defendant in the later trial
as long as the probability of his guilt of pickpocketing was lower than 100%.
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defendant used unreasonable (but nearly reasonable) force.103 Aggregating the
weights of the two “almost defenses” could lead to the defendant’s acquittal.
Courts, however, do not aggregate defenses, at least not explicitly.
But, even more interestingly, cross-claim normative aggregation could also
be made across several criminal charges, when the same defendant committed
several “almost offenses,” and the aggregation of those “almost offenses” could
justify conviction. The next example illustrates such a case:
Example III.3. Several Minor Misdeeds. The defendant is accused of five
separate offenses, allegedly committed in different times and places, of
interrupting the work of a public official. None of the acts considered
separately reaches the point where the behavior is defined as an offense.
Under prevailing law, the defendant would be acquitted of the five charges
brought against him.104 But if all cases were aggregated, the court could reach a
different decision. Thus, if the behavior in each case is reprehensible, but not
reprehensible enough to justify the application of the criminal law, the
cumulative weight of all five cases could be more than enough to justify such
an application. We can think of two main reasons why five cases could justify

103.

104.

In State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987), the defendant was charged with murder
after shooting a stranger whom he discovered in bed with his wife. Id. at 309. The defendant
raised the affirmative defenses of insanity and self-defense. Id. at 312. He lost on both
defenses at trial, and was convicted of murder in the first degree, but the appellate court,
citing the particular emotional stress of the defendant’s encounter with the victim, reduced
his conviction to voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 312-15. One possible explanation for the
appellate court’s decision is that the court implicitly engaged in normative aggregation of his
two “almost defenses.” In Johnson v. State, 36 So. 3d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), the
defendant raised two defense claims: that he was not present at the place where the murder
took place, and that the codefendant’s fatal beating of the victim was an unforeseen
independent act falling outside of the original plan of the crime. Id. at 171. The jury denied
both defenses and convicted him of second-degree murder, and the appellate court
subsequently upheld the trial court’s jury instruction and thus the verdict. Id. at 171-72.
From the facts as presented by the appellate court, it seems possible that one defense (the
claim that the defendant was not present when the killing took place) was not established
with sufficient factual certainty, while the other defense (that the killing constituted an
unforeseen independent act) fell short of the requisite normative threshold of
unforeseeability. Id. If this reading of the case is right, then a mixed aggregation (factual and
normative) might have brought a different result.
See, e.g., State v. Stolen, 755 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Neb. 2008) (reversing the accused’s
conviction on the ground that physical interference is required in order to commit
obstruction of government operations). But cf. Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 841-2
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for interference with the duties
of a public servant because he disregarded the officer’s requests to stand back by repeatedly
entering the crime scene area).
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conviction even if one case does not: first, it may be that applying criminal law
to one occurrence only is not cost-justified, while with five occurrences it is
cost-justified. Second, the recurrence of the same event five times may shed
new light on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s behavior as a whole and may
justify convicting him.
Criminal law has a number of aggregation doctrines that allow courts to
normatively aggregate separate offenses (or “almost offenses”) so as to create
an entirely new offense.
One example is the offense of stalking. Under anti-stalking acts, a single act
of harassment does not constitute an offense, but if that behavior occurs several
times, then at a certain point it becomes an offense.105 The New Jersey
Criminal Code, for example, defines stalking as “repeatedly maintaining a
visual or physical proximity to a person.”106 Thus, the Code arguably
formalizes a type of normative aggregation: it instructs courts that one act of
harassment is bad, but not bad enough to justify the law’s intervention, while
several such acts might cumulatively justify a conviction. A second
interpretation is that one act of harassment could be accidental, with no
malicious motives, and therefore, in order to reduce the risk of false
convictions, the law requires more than one act of harassment.107
In other cases, a single act is an offense, but if that behavior is repeated
several times, this series of offenses can constitute a more severe offense. That
could also be regarded as normative aggregation. A typical example is the
importation of drugs: if the accused imports drugs once and the quantity is
small enough, he would be convicted of the offense of drug possession of the
first (lowest) degree. If, however, the accused imports a large enough quantity,
then he would be convicted of a higher degree of the offense. The largequantity condition could be satisfied even if the accused imports drugs several
times, each time moving only a small quantity that would qualify

105.

106.

107.
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See Heather C. Melton, Stalking: A Review of the Literature and Direction for the Future, 25
CRIM. JUST. REV. 246, 247 (2000) (“The term ‘stalking’ is used to describe the willful,
repeated, and malicious following, harassing, or threatening of another person . . . .”).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10-a (West 2012). For the New Jersey Superior Court’s
interpretation of the stalking clause, see State v. Cardell, 723 A.2d 111, 114-18 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999).
In State v. Berg, 213 P.3d 1249, 1250 (Or. 2009) (en banc), the defendant was convicted of
tampering with a witness and stalking, “based on allegations that he had repeatedly
trespassed on his neighbors’ property, engaged in aggressive and offensive conduct toward
them, and threatened one of them with various consequences if she ‘showed up in court.’”
The court focused on one specific event and convicted the defendant. Id. at 1250-51. This
decision might be interpreted as an implicit aggregation of the numerous misbehaviors of
the defendant, when each of them standing alone would not constitute an offense.
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independently for the first degree, as long as the total quantity across all
occasions is large enough.108
Another example of normative aggregation is the doctrine embedded in the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).109 Under RICO,
a person who is a member of an enterprise that has committed any two
specified crimes within a ten-year period can be charged with racketeering.110
Thus, the offense of racketeering can be characterized as a result of normative
aggregation of two separate offenses (committed by an enterprise) which can
underlie a new offense (committed by an individual) of belonging to that
criminal enterprise.
The use of normative aggregation to address cooperative criminal activity
has cropped up in other settings. Police often have a good idea of who the local
mischief-makers are. In big cities, these people often belong to criminal gangs.
When rival gangs fight over turf and cause disorder, the police have reason to
suspect that many members of each gang are involved but will not have
sufficient proof to convict anyone of the offense other than those who
participate directly. RICO tried to address this problem, but proving the two
separate crimes that are necessary for applying RICO can also be too high a
hurdle. Other laws, such as Chicago’s gang loitering law,111 attempted to
address this problem indirectly by permitting the police to disperse groups of

108.

109.
110.
111.

In United States v. Shonubi, 802 F. Supp. 859, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d, 998 F.2d 84 (2d
Cir. 1993), the defendant, arriving from Nigeria, was arrested at JFK International Airport
with 427.4 grams of heroin. He was charged with importing heroin and possessing heroin
with the intent to distribute it. The court found that in addition to the last occasion when
the defendant was arrested, he had made seven other trips to Nigeria. The court concluded
that those seven trips had been made for the purpose of importing heroin, and therefore
multiplied the quantity of 427.4 grams imported on the time of arrest by eight. Id. at 860-61.
The defendant was convicted and the court, applying the drug quantity table of the
sentencing guidelines, classified the case as falling under “level 34” of the table, which relates
to a drug quantity between 3 and 10 kilograms, instead of “level 28” of the table, which
relates to a drug quantity between 400 and 700 grams. United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d
1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1997). That classification of the offense allowed the court to impose on
the defendant a much harsher sentence than if the case were classified under “level 28” of the
table. Id. The court’s decision was later vacated and remanded twice by the Second Circuit,
first in United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1993), and later in 103 F.3d 1085 (2d
Cir. 1997), after the district court had reinstated the same verdict on remand.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
Id. § 1961(5).
This law was struck down by the Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41
(1999). Chicago passed a new anti-gang ordinance after the Supreme Court decided
Morales. See Dirk Johnson, Chicago Council Tries Anew with Anti-Gang Ordinance, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/22/us/chicago-council-tries-anew
-with-anti-gang-ordinance.html.
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people if a known gang member was present, and arrest anyone who failed to
comply with orders to disperse.112 We suspect that this law enabled police to, in
effect, aggregate claims against known mischief-makers—people who had
committed minor acts of wrongdoing (normative aggregation) or were
reasonably suspected of having been involved in serious offenses (factual
aggregation).
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
Cross-person aggregation is largely absent in criminal law, probably
because it could infringe on the accused’s constitutional rights. Thus, if there
are several defendants accused of committing several crimes, none of them will
be convicted even if statistically each of them probably committed some of the
crimes. A market share liability approach, applied by some jurisdictions to tort
cases (mainly in the DES cases113), is unlikely to be considered suitable for
criminal cases. In criminal trials, the prosecution must prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and statistical evidence cannot be the main
evidence for conviction.114
However, RICO can be understood as a form of cross-person aggregation.
RICO is frequently used to target racketeering offenses in which a large
number of people are victims of minor offenses like drug crimes and
prostitution. Prosecutors enjoy considerable discretion, and they might choose
not to prosecute the crimes individually because the harm to each victim is
relatively minor. RICO enables them to aggregate the offenses, perhaps on the
theory that the individually minor harms should be considered significant
when aggregated across victims. This type of cross-person aggregation might
therefore be considered normative, but there is also a factual version. Suppose
that we cannot identify which of a number of gang members committed certain
crimes, but we can convict all of them of belonging to a gang involved in a
criminal enterprise. As a result, some gang members may be, in effect,
convicted of the crimes committed by other gang members. Here, RICO
permits factual aggregation across persons: we cannot connect any particular
member to any particular victims with confidence, but we can be confident that
all the gang members committed a crime against at least some of the victims.

112.
113.
114.
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Morales, 527 U.S. at 47.
See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
See STEIN, supra note 24, at 183-85 (explaining why statistical evidence, standing alone,
cannot be the basis for conviction).
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This logic is most clearly visible in the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise
liability in international criminal law. The doctrine was recognized by the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadic case.115 The
Appeals Chamber held that a defendant could be convicted for taking part in a
joint criminal enterprise that foreseeably resulted in the killing of victims, even
though the original purpose of the enterprise was to rid the region of the nonSerbian population, not specifically to kill, and the defendant could not be
directly tied to the killing.116 The foreseeability requirement is inherently
probabilistic: if a person joins a group with an agenda of causing mayhem, that
person’s expected liability increases with the number of expected victims.
Joint criminal enterprise liability has been criticized by criminal law
scholars and some international law scholars who believe that it erodes the
procedural protections of defendants. They argue that sympathy for the victims
of mass atrocity has caused governments and international lawyers to endorse
international criminal law doctrines that are unfair to defendants.117 From
another perspective, however, the use of aggregation rules for mass atrocities
makes good sense. Normative aggregation may be justified because relatively
weak forms of complicity that are not blameworthy in normal times may be
considered blameworthy in times of mass atrocity even if one does not go so far
as to endorse collective responsibility. Factual aggregation may also be justified
because the large number of victims may in itself raise the probability that a
defendant was criminally involved, as in the Tadic case.
iv. public law
A. Factual Aggregation
In public law, problems of cross-claim factual aggregation arise in
numerous settings. Consider the following example:

115.
116.

117.

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
Id. ¶¶ 230-232. For a lucid discussion of the Tadic case and joint criminal enterprise liability,
see Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 104-07 (2005).
See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 116; George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin,
Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
539 (2005).
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Example IV.1. Targeted Killing: Alternative Claims. The President seeks
to use military force to kill a suspected terrorist in Pakistan. However,
there is uncertainty both about whether the suspect is planning an
attack on U.S. targets and about whether the person is a member of Al
Qaeda. Assume that killing the person is lawful if either condition is
valid. Suppose that the probability of each independently is 40% and
that the law requires a probability of more than 50% to justify the
killing.
We suspect that the President’s lawyers would advise him that he cannot
order the killing of the target. But if aggregation were accepted, the probability
that the killing would be lawful would be 64%, and thus the correct legal
advice would be the opposite.
Now consider a case of cross-element factual aggregation.
Example IV.2. Targeted Killing: Cumulative Elements. Same as Example
IV.1, except suppose that the law provides that the killing is lawful only
if the target is a non-American and the target is planning an attack. The
probability that the target is a non-American is 60%, and the
probability that the target is planning an attack is 60%.
We believe that the President’s lawyers would advise him that he cannot
order the killing of the target because the probability that the target is not an
American and is planning an attack is only 36% (at least if the probabilities are
independent—and they may not be). If we are right, then factual aggregation
of several claims is applied inconsistently—barred in the first case, required in
the second case. Our minimal suggestion is that factual aggregation of claims
should be used consistently—if the President cannot order the killing in the
second case, then he must be permitted to do so in the first case.118
B. Normative Aggregation
As in the other legal settings we have examined, we can imagine cases
where cross-claim normative aggregation could occur in public law.
Example IV.3. Targeted Killing: Two “Almost Claims.” The President
seeks to use military force to kill an American citizen who is alleged to
be associated with Al Qaeda and who lives in Sana’a, the capital of

118.

46

Note that Example IV.1 involves cross-claim aggregation and Example IV.2 involves crosselement aggregation. Although in other contexts these types of aggregation might properly
be treated differently, we see no justification for different treatment in these two examples.
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Yemen. The President claims two sources of authority: a statute that
gives him the authority to use military force against Al Qaeda, and his
constitutional power to use military force abroad to protect American
interests. Each claim is at best controversial—many contest that the
statute authorizes action outside a conventional battlefield, and that the
President can use his constitutional powers to kill an American citizen.
We suspect that most commentators believe that the President could use
military force in this case only if at least one of his claims standing alone could
be established. Consequently, in Example IV.3, the President would not be
permitted to order a targeted killing. Under the aggregation approach, one
might reason differently. The President has two “almost claims”: that under
the statute he can use force against a terrorist in foreign territory beyond the
control of domestic law enforcement authorities—even if not on the
“battlefield,” strictly speaking—and that under the Constitution he can use
force against enemies abroad to protect American interests, even if the enemy is
an American citizen. If we aggregate the normative weight of these “almost
claims,” then the President arguably possesses the authority to order a targeted
killing in Example IV.3.
This argument might seem fanciful, but it is fairly common in
constitutional adjudication involving the authority of the executive. In Dames &
Moore v. Regan,119 for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the President’s
authority to suspend American claims against Iran based on an aggregation of
statutory and constitutional powers:
Although we have declined to conclude that the [International
Emergency Economic Powers Act] IEEPA or the Hostage Act directly
authorizes the President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted,
we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area
in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least
with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the
President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in
which he might act. Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate
authority does not, “especially . . . in the areas of foreign policy and
national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by
the Executive. On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely
related to the question of the President’s authority in a particular case
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion

119.

453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent presidential
responsibility [. . . .]”120
The two statutes, the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, did not independently
authorize the President’s action, but each almost did. That, along with the
President’s constitutional authority in the area (which also does not by itself
authorize the action, but almost does), in the aggregate provided the President
with the claimed authority.
Another line of cases endorses cross-claim normative aggregation where
plaintiffs allege violations of the right to free exercise of religion.
Example IV.4. Free Exercise of Religion and Free Speech. A church
challenges a zoning ordinance that provides that only industrial
structures may be built in an area of a city. The church argues that the
zoning ordinance violates both its constitutional right to free exercise of
religion and its constitutional right to free speech. Taken separately, the
claims would fail. The zoning ordinance is a valid neutral law that does
not discriminate against religious organizations, and it does not put an
unreasonable burden on speech.
In Employment Division v. Smith,121 the Supreme Court upheld a statute
denying unemployment benefits to a person who had illegally used peyote in a
religious ritual. Distinguishing (on controversial grounds) an earlier precedent
that held that laws that burden the free exercise of religion are subject to strict
scrutiny,122 the Court held that any “neutral” and “generally applicable” law
survives constitutional challenge under the Free Exercise Clause even if it
incidentally burdens religious practice.123 However, the Court also recognized a
“hybrid” exception. Where a plaintiff can show that a neutral law burdens both
religious practice and another constitutionally protected activity, the law is
subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore will be struck down unless the
government can show a compelling state interest.124

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 882-85 (distinguishing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
Id. at 881-82.
Id. The Court did not apply the hybrid exception to the plaintiff’s claim, presumably
because the plaintiff alleged that only one constitutional norm was violated. Id. The Court
used the hybrid exception to distinguish, among other cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), where the Court struck down a neutral law because of the burden it imposed on
religious association. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. The Court’s reasoning has been harshly
criticized by numerous commentators because, among other reasons, Yoder itself did not
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The hybrid rights exception fits our definition of cross-claim normative
aggregation. In the words of one scholar, “[A] less than sufficient free exercise
claim, plus a less than sufficient claim arising under a different part of the
Constitution, together trigger the compelling interest test.”125 More formally,
consider a claim that a statute violates two provisions of the Constitution, X
and Y, where the plaintiff can show that the statute does not serve a compelling
state interest under the strict scrutiny test. Although the statute does not
violate X or Y individually, it does violate them jointly, and thus would be
struck down.
Applying the hybrid exception to Example IV.4 could result in accepting
the church’s claim and overriding the zoning ordinance. The lower courts have
heard numerous hybrid cases similar to our example.126 Churches have
frequently challenged zoning ordinances on the grounds that the ordinances
violate the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause (or the Equal
Protection Clause). Each claim is individually weak: zoning ordinances are
usually neutral and generally applicable—for example, an ordinance might
permit only industrial buildings in an area where people want to build a
church—and so do not violate the Free Exercise Clause by themselves. And
zoning ordinances are rarely held to violate the Free Speech Clause because the
ability to speak to an audience does not depend on having a building in a
particular area. Yet, under the hybrid rights approach, a church could in theory
prevail as long as each individually losing claim is “colorable” or exceeds some
threshold of plausibility.127

125.
126.

127.

mention hybrid rights—the outcome was based solely on the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g.,
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109, 1121-22 (1990).
Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants To Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public
Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 430-31 (1994).
For an excellent but dated survey, see William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the
Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211
(1998). Esser, however, concludes that the hybrid claims prevail only when the
constitutional claim with which a Free Exercise claim is paired would independently prevail.
Id. at 242-43. The literature on hybrid rights is quite negative. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden &
Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division
v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573 (2003); McConnell, supra note
124; Kyle Still, Smith’s Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right: An Unintelligent Design,
85 N.C. L. REV. 385 (2006). These authors argue that the doctrine makes no sense on its own
terms and has sown confusion among the lower courts. The Smith-related case law has been
complicated by the effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2006), which we ignore because of our focus on constitutional issues.
See, e.g., Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700
(10th Cir. 1998) (requiring that a showing of an infringement of constitutional rights be
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Another group of examples involves challenges to laws that allegedly
infringe on the parental right to educate one’s children. The right to educate
one’s children is a constitutional right, but a weak one, and parents usually fail
when they challenge truancy laws and schools’ educational policies on the basis
of this right. But when parents claim that educational laws infringe on both
their parental rights and their free exercise rights, even though the laws are
neutral and generally applicable, they make out a hybrid claim and may obtain
relief.128
Outside of free exercise, it is difficult to find clear examples of the
recognition of hybrid rights, but in a number of cases the doctrinal logic
suggests such a theory. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,129 the Court struck
down a state law that forced the Boy Scouts to admit a gay counselor in
violation of that organization’s bylaws. The Court held that the statute violated
the Boy Scouts members’ rights to “expressive association,” a right which
might be taken as a hybrid of the right to free speech and the right to
association.130 In Griswold v. Connecticut,131 the Court struck down a statute that
prohibited the sale of contraceptives. In a much-criticized opinion, the Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated a right to privacy
derived from the “emanations” of a number of different rights in the
Constitution, including rights under the First, Third, and Fourth
Amendments.132 Because the Court did not hold that the statute violated any of
these rights individually, the implication is that the statute was
unconstitutional only because it violated those rights jointly, although the
opinion certainly does not make this argument explicitly. Arguably, in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees,133 the Court derived a right of intimate association (such
as noninterference in family life) from the right to association in the First
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“colorable”); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir.
1991) (instructing the district court, on remand, to construe a church’s challenge to a zoning
ordinance as a hybrid claim entitled to strict scrutiny).
See, e.g., People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993) (holding in favor of a hybrid
claim that a law that required teachers to be certified, and thus interfered with
homeschooling, violated free exercise and parental control rights).
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 644. A somewhat similar case is Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005), where
the Court held that a teacher’s claim that she was discharged for attending an anti-WTO
rally with a group of students was a “hybrid speech/association claim,” which raised
questions as to whether the constitutional standard based only on violations of speech rights
should be applied. Id. at 696.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
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Amendment and the right to due process in the Fourteenth Amendment.134
Finally, it has been argued that several recent Supreme Court cases are best
understood as reflecting a hybrid claim involving due process and equal
protection rights.135 In Lawrence v. Texas,136 for example, the Court resisted the
equal protection argument that homosexuals form a suspect class, and the due
process argument that a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy is substantively
irrational—but, combining concerns reflected in both clauses, concluded that
the statute was unconstitutional.137
Thus, we can identify two sorts of hybrid rights cases. The first is where
the constitutional claims are treated as separate, but a remedy is granted if each
claim is “colorable” or crosses some other threshold. The second is where the
courts develop the doctrine, creating a new right by combining two or more
recognized rights. Smith illustrates the first approach: the Court refrained from
recognizing a new right to, say, “parental-religious control.” The right to
privacy recognized in Griswold illustrates the creation of a new right on the
basis of two or more recognized rights. This doctrinal evolution is analogous to
the way the unconscionability doctrine was developed so as to aggregate
previously recognized claims.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that outside these settings
courts rarely respond sympathetically to hybrid claims. In Wilkie v. Robbins,138
for example, the owner of a ranch claimed that officials from the Bureau of
Land Management engaged in a campaign of harassment over a number of
years, including trespasses and malicious prosecutions, in an effort to compel
him to grant an easement to the U.S. government. The rancher brought two
Fifth Amendment claims, describing the Bureau’s campaign as both a taking
and an illegal form of retaliation.139 Of these, the Court appears to have
considered only his retaliation claim. While the Court acknowledged serious
government misconduct, it ultimately declined to allow a Bivens action for
retaliation under the Fifth Amendment.140 What is notable about this case is
that the Court evidently believed that the Bureau had acted wrongfully, but did
not consider the possibility that even if the Bureau did not violate two separate
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See Marcum v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733-34 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (concluding that Roberts
defined intimate association as a “hybrid right”).
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750 (2011).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Yoshino, supra note 135, at 778-79.
551 U.S. 537, 541-43 (2007).
Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 561-62.
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Fifth Amendment rights individually, it did violate the two of them taken
together. This approach is the norm—the hybrid rights cases are the
exceptional cases. Plaintiffs frequently argue constitutional rights violations in
the alternative and, outside the cases we discuss above, courts rarely address
the possibility that individually weak claims may be jointly strong.
For another example, consider United States v. Sanders,141 a case in which a
defendant was sentenced to a term of thirty-seven months for committing a
crime, was released at the end of his sentence, and then was sent back to prison
four years later after an appellate court (following substantial delays)
determined that his sentence should have been 180 months.142 The defendant
argued that re-imprisonment after such a delay violated his rights to
substantive and procedural due process.143 Other courts had held that a
defendant who is sent back to prison as a result of an administrative error could
have a substantive due process claim based on the fact that he or she had
developed an expectation as to the finality of the sentence and that this
expectation was unfairly disappointed. By contrast, the Sixth Circuit held that
Sanders’s sentence had been appealed by both sides, so Sanders had no reason
to believe that his sentence was final.144 The court also rejected Sanders’s
procedural due process claim, noting that although the four-year delay was
severe, Sanders could not show that it resulted from bad faith or an attempt by
the government to gain a tactical advantage.145 The substantive due process and
procedural due process claims were both colorable, but individually they were
too weak to warrant relief.
The dissent argued that Sanders should be released, based on an analysis
that, in the majority’s words, “seems to conflate the procedural due process
factors . . . with the substantive due process right . . . to create a sort of hybrid
right not to be returned to prison.”146 The dissent, in essence, argued that even
if the substantive due process violation was not as serious as in other cases
(Sanders’s expectation about his sentence should not have been as
“crystallized” as in a clerical error case since the sentence was on appeal), and
the procedural due process claim was not as serious as in other cases (the delay
was significant but not caused by bad faith), the violations jointly considered
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452 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 576-77.
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 583.

aggregation and law

entitled Sanders to relief.147 Like the Supreme Court in the Roberts case, the
dissent sought to assert a new hybrid right that was based on two recognized
constitutional rights, each of which was independently too weak to justify a
constitutional remedy.
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
As we saw in Part I, tort law permits aggregation only on occasion, and
otherwise falls well short of what aggregation would require. Recall, for
instance, Example I.8, which involved a mass tort with indeterminate victims.
The defendant’s factory pollutes, creating a statistical likelihood of harming an
additional 25 people per year, but none of those people can be identified. Tort
law does not permit cross-person aggregation, so a remedy is not available in
this case. Tort law also does not usually permit cross-claim factual aggregation
and normative aggregation. Because of these limitations, Congress and state
legislatures have enacted numerous statutes that regulate behavior that
otherwise slips through tort law. This is an important domain of public law.
Indeed, this type of regulation is ubiquitous—consider speed limits, for
example, which protect unidentified future victims by regulating ex ante—and
the proposition that public law overcomes the anti-aggregation bias in private
law by permitting cross-person aggregation is understood in the literature,
even if not put in those terms.148 But it is worth dwelling on this point, for it
shows clearly that the anti-aggregation bias in private law is (at least with
respect to cross-person aggregation) not based on any fundamental moral
commitments.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency will typically identify
sources of pollution such as factories, and conduct studies that determine
whether the pollution emitted by those factories causes harm. The Agency can
rarely identify particular people who have been harmed because of the
difficulty of untangling other causal factors. But the Agency can use statistical
techniques to determine the difference between the number of cases of, say,
lung cancer in the population exposed to the pollution as well as to background
factors, and the number of cases of lung cancer in a population exposed to the
background factors alone. If the difference is large enough, the Agency will
issue regulations requiring the factories to reduce their pollution. No victim

147.
148.

United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 589-93 (6th Cir. 2006).
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357,
363 (1984) (noting that regulation may be superior to the tort system when victims cannot
identify wrongdoers).
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receives a remedy, but in the future there will be fewer victims. This is a clear
example of cross-person aggregation.149
Public law also aggregates across persons. Courts have relaxed standing
doctrine so as to allow governments, agencies, and even individuals to bring
tort actions on behalf of large groups of people who may have been harmed
only in a statistical sense. Among many such cases,150 a prominent example
involves religious displays on public property, which are forbidden under the
First Amendment if they are sectarian.151 One way of thinking about religious
displays is that they inflict a nonphysical, and hence difficult-to-prove but
nonetheless important, psychological harm on a group of people outside the
religion that the display celebrates. If only one religious dissenter saw a display,
she would be unable to prove that she was harmed, but if many religious
dissenters saw the display—as the “public” nature of the display implies—it is
statistically likely that at least one of them was harmed. We believe this
statistical likelihood, itself rooted in cross-person aggregation, is the reason
why the law gives even a single individual standing to bring a claim. Such an
individual in effect sues on behalf of the group, given that a publicly displayed
religious symbol by definition reaches a multitude of observers, even if in
imaginable circumstances the display is so remotely located that only a few
people will ever see it. This approach can be contrasted to the law’s reluctance
to give remedies to tort victims who claim emotional but not physical harm.152
The difference is that religious displays by their nature are observed by large
groups of people so that small likelihoods of harm can be aggregated, whereas
torts that cause emotional harms generally involve only single victims.153
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More specifically, it is a kind of cross-person factual aggregation; the victims are (on
average) harmed but cannot prove their harm above the requisite probability threshold
individually, though they can collectively.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the state has standing to
challenge the EPA’s refusal to issue greenhouse gas regulations where the harm caused by
climate change does not result in a particular injury to identifiable people); Georgia v. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (holding that the state has standing to bring a tort claim
against a polluter on behalf of its citizens).
See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
See EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 274-75 (noting that recovery for emotional harm without
physical impact is generally denied everywhere today).
But see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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v. explanations and proposals
A. The Arbitrariness of Legal Boundaries
The best explanation for courts’ inconsistent approaches to these
aggregation puzzles is that the division of the legal system into bodies of law,
and then those bodies of law into separate claims, and then again those claims
into elements, brings costs as well as benefits. Courts respond to those costs by
aggregating under certain circumstances, but because they respond in a
cautious, ad hoc way, fearful of sacrificing the benefits of disaggregation, the
law as a whole contains many inconsistencies.
To understand this problem, we start with factual aggregation and return
to our first example from tort law. The general purposes of tort law are
twofold: to optimally deter people from imposing externalities on each other
and, in some cases, to compensate people who have suffered from those
externalities.154 An ideal decisionmaker who faced no decision costs could be
given a simple instruction, such as “maximize social welfare” or “minimize
social costs.” Such a decisionmaker would aggregate harms and probabilities to
fulfill the purpose of tort law in all circumstances.155 Take, for example, the
defendant who acted negligently with 40% probability while driving a vehicle
that was inherently dangerous with 40% probability (Example I.1: The
Inherently Dangerous Vehicle). In a world without decision costs, aggregation
would help to efficiently deter the defendant. If a person is considering
whether to engage in these actions, and knows that she will not be held liable
because her behavior falls between the cracks of two claims that will not be
aggregated, she will engage in those actions, even though in an expected sense
they will cause harm which is higher than their benefit. By holding such a
person liable, aggregation deters socially costly behavior. Now take, as a second
example, the defendant hospital whose doctors negligently caused two separate
injuries, each with 60% probability (a variation of Example I.3: Injury in the
Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries). Without aggregation, the defendant’s
expected liability would be excessive and overdeterrence might result.156 With
aggregation, however, a decisionmaker would hold the defendant liable for
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Under a negligence rule, such compensation would be appropriate only if the externalities
were inefficiently (or unreasonably) imposed.
But not in the very rare cases when aggregation may create over- or underdeterrence. See
supra note 25.
See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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only one injury, because the probability that the defendant negligently caused
the two injuries is only 36%.
But, as the literature on rules versus standards makes clear,157 simply telling
decisionmakers to maximize social welfare—a pure standard—would not work
very well in a world in which decision costs are often high. The preponderanceof-the-evidence rule, applied with no aggregation, greatly simplifies
decisionmaking; if courts were required to make point estimates and combine
them, then their job would be more difficult. It would also be more difficult for
parties to predict the legal consequences of their behavior.158 Thus, the
structure of our current legal system reduces decision costs, but in doing so,
sacrifices some of the efficiency gains that result from factual aggregation.
We turn now to normative aggregation. Take Example II.2 (Non-Material
Breach and Misleading Conduct), where the defendant engages in misleading
conduct in order to secure the plaintiff’s consent to a contract and subsequently
engages in a breach that falls just short of material. A court would not allow the
plaintiff to rescind the contract because each claim is considered separately.
Aggregation would create a more complicated rule for both the parties to the
contract and the courts, and thus increase decision costs. Rather than
determine (1) whether the misleading conduct crosses a normative threshold,
and (2) whether the breach crosses a normative threshold, the court would be
required to determine (1) whether the misleading conduct crosses a normative
threshold, (2) whether the breach crosses a normative threshold, and
(3) whether the combined actions cross a normative threshold. This more
complicated test may well create an unacceptable level of difficulty and
uncertainty. But nonaggregation also entails costs: it permits a defendant to
escape liability for two actions that are jointly, by assumption, inefficient or
unjust.
This argument explains why one can more easily find examples of withinelement factual aggregation than cross-claim factual aggregation and
normative aggregation, and why courts are more likely to aggregate claims of a
similar nature than claims of a different nature. Consider, for example, a case
where a plaintiff can show that the defendant committed a tort against him
with 40% probability and a breach of contract against him with 40%
probability. Combining the breach and tort claims raises possible complexities
and unintended consequences: for example, if there are different statutes of
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See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1993).
For the difficulties of factual aggregation, see Levmore, supra note 8, at 726-33. Most of
Levmore’s examples come from tort law and relate to what we call cross-element
aggregation.
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limitations for contract claims and tort claims, which statute should be used
when the claims are combined? And if the suit is for damages, there could be
different damages rules for breach of contract and tort, so a question arises as
to which damages rule should be used when the claims are combined.159 By
contrast, when the claims are of the same nature, no such conflicts arise.
Should the law aggregate more than it does? Our minimal suggestion is
that the doctrine is currently inconsistent, and that the courts would do well to
bring consistency to this area. If normative aggregation in the hybrid rights
doctrine is good policy, for example, then normative aggregation should be
good policy in other areas of public law, and in private law, too, mutatis
mutandis. If the lack of normative aggregation in many areas of the law is good
policy, then normative aggregation should be purged from Religion Clause
jurisprudence and other areas of the law where it appears. The same point can
be made about the other forms of aggregation. To be sure, there may be
relevant policy differences that explain the apparently inconsistent use of
aggregation in different areas of the law, but we have not been able to identify
them.
It is also possible to take a more aggressive view that courts should
aggregate whenever decision costs are low. When decision costs are low,
factual aggregation will generally improve the accuracy of adjudication while
not changing substantive law. Normative aggregation should improve
substantive law, in the sense of vindicating values and policy choices that are
already found in the law, but which defendants can violate if claims are not
aggregated. However, it may be difficult for courts to determine when their
own decision costs are low or not, and as we note elsewhere, in some cases the
benefits from aggregation are minimal,160 so the gains from pursuing
aggregation more broadly may sometimes be outweighed by the costs.
B. Other Explanations for Failures To Aggregate and Possible
Objections to Aggregation
There could be other explanations for courts’ reluctance to aggregate.
Those explanations could also be grounds for objections to aggregation. Most
of the explanations—or objections—relate to one type of aggregation but not
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Note that these questions are much less acute when the plaintiff is able to establish both tort
and contract claims separately. In that case, the plaintiff would generally be entitled to the
remedy that is more favorable to him.
See supra p. 15 and the discussion in the text accompanying note 66.
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others, or to aggregation in one field of the law but not others. Some of the
explanations—or objections—are efficiency-related but others are not.
1. Corrective Justice
Under the principles of corrective justice, the defendant should rectify the
injustice he inflicted upon the plaintiff through his wrongdoing by
compensating her for the harm done. Theorists of corrective justice maintain
that it is crucial that the defendant rectifies the injustice done to the plaintiff
and not to an unaffected third party.161 Moreover, under corrective justice
principles, the determination of liability should rest upon the relationship
between the defendant and plaintiff as doer and sufferer, and anything outside
that relationship should be ignored.162
How might corrective justice theorists respond to aggregation in private
law (mainly in tort law)? We expect corrective justice theorists to oppose crossperson aggregation, since such aggregation would require taking into account
wrongs committed toward third parties while determining the remedies
available to the plaintiff against the defendant. Thus, in Example I.8 (Mass
Torts: Indeterminate Plaintiffs), a factory wrongfully created radiation, and
while it can be established that 25 out of 125 people suffered harm due to the
radiation, it is impossible for each plaintiff to establish, by the preponderance
of the evidence, that her harm is the result of the radiation. Corrective justice
theorists would maintain that all suits should be dismissed since in each and
every case it is more probable than not that the defendant did not injure the
plaintiff. The mere fact that there are many plaintiffs, and that 25 of them
probably suffered harm as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing, should be
considered under corrective justice as irrelevant to the determination of
liability.163 Market share liability, however, could be reconciled with at least
some versions of corrective justice.164
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See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISK AND WRONGS 380-85 (2002) (discussing the focus of corrective
justice on the relationship between the injurer and the victim); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 63-66 (1995) (same).
This is an implication of the correlativity requirement, under which liability should be
imposed for harms which are the materialization of the risks that defined the injurer’s
conduct as negligent. See WEINRIB, supra note 161, at 159 (“The consequences for which the
defendant is liable are restricted to those within the risks that render the act wrongful in the
first place.”).
See id. at 63-66 (explaining that corrective justice focuses only on the relationship between
the injurer and the victim, and implying that those two should be identified); see also
Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
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We see no reason for corrective justice theorists to oppose cross-claim
factual aggregation or normative aggregation if it relates to one specific event.
The harder case is when there are two separate events occurring between the
defendant and the plaintiff and neither of them can be established by the
preponderance of the evidence to justify liability, but it can be established by
the preponderance of the evidence that at least one of them justifies liability.
We suspect that corrective justice theorists would oppose such aggregation,
arguing that each event should be considered separately and in isolation from
the other.165 Thus, in Example I.3 (Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two
Injuries), a patient suffered two distinct harms, each of which might have been
caused by a different doctor. The hospital is vicariously liable for both doctors’
wrongdoing. While the patient cannot establish the liability of either doctor
independently, he can establish that at least one of the harms was caused by a
doctor’s wrongdoing. Corrective justice theorists would probably argue that
each event should be considered separately: the determination of liability
should be done per event, and not across events (we suspect that corrective
justice theorists would persist in that view even if, in our example, the two
harms might have been the result of the same doctor’s wrongdoing166). In any
event, while it is possible that corrective justice intuitions may account for
limits on some types of aggregation, they cannot explain the bias against
aggregation in most cases.
2. Incommensurability
In law and economics it is assumed that all potential outcomes are
commensurable and comparable to one another. But there are also different
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LAW 321, 330-39 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing against liability for lost chances of
recovery in the absence of reliance or lost opportunities for alternative treatment).
Corrective justice will support probabilistic recovery when three cumulative conditions are
met: (1) the wrongdoers pay for the harm caused by their wrongdoings; (2) the victims are
compensated for the harm wrongfully caused to them; and (3) the wrongdoers make
payments to or participate in the mechanism that facilitates the compensation of their
victims. These three conditions are satisfied in the DES cases, as well as in other cases of
recurring wrongs when: a group of wrongdoers inflicts harms numerous times on a group
of victims; the harm caused by each wrongdoer and the harm caused to each victim is
verifiable; but it is impossible for each victim to prove the identity of the specific
wrongdoer, from the group of wrongdoers, who caused her harm. See PORAT & STEIN, supra
note 29, at 132-33.
See WEINRIB, supra note 161, at 75 (“Corrective justice involves the intrinsic unity of the doer
and sufferer of the same harm.”).
Corrective justice might support liability, however, if the two events can be reasonably
understood as one event occurring in two stages.
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views that consider certain outcomes incommensurable.167 A possible
explanation for courts’ reluctance to engage in some aggregations but not in
others is their refusal to evaluate claims of different natures according to one
common scale.
Take Examples II.1 (Either Material Breach or Fraudulent
Misrepresentation) and II.2 (Non-Material Breach and Misleading Conduct).
Both examples deal with a case where the plaintiff argues that he was entitled
to rescind a contract because the defendant engaged in fraudulent
misrepresentation in order to secure the plaintiff’s consent to the contract and
subsequently materially breached the contract. In Example II.1, there is a 40%
probability that each of the two claims holds, while in Example II.2, although
the facts are not disputed, neither the misrepresentation nor the breach,
standing alone, is severe enough to justify the rescission of the contract. In
order to aggregate the two claims in both examples, it seems that courts need a
common scale to measure misrepresentation on the one hand and breach on
the other hand. Finding such a scale is impossible—or so the commensurability
objection would be.
The commensurability objection would probably be more applicable to
Example II.2 than to Example II.1. In Example II.1, the court just needs to
estimate the probability that the defendant behaved in a way that warrants the
rescission of the contract by the plaintiff, and this does not require measuring
fraudulent misrepresentation and breach according to one common scale.
Example II.2 is more complex. In this case the court would have to decide
whether the combination of “almost” fraudulent misrepresentation and
“almost” material breach is sufficient for rescission. The court would need
some common scale to evaluate both misbehaviors and aggregate them.
Or take the question, raised in our discussion of both tort law and criminal
law, of whether two “almost defenses” should be sufficient to establish a valid
defense (insanity and failure to mitigate in a tort case (Example I.5), or mistake
and self-defense in a criminal case). Here, too, the defenses have different
rationales, and any aggregation would be of a different nature from the
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See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1-16 (1993) (arguing for a
pluralist approach to the valuation of goods, based on the idea that goods differ in kind or
quality from one another and cannot always be measured by a common criterion); Martha
C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of)
Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1997) (arguing that “[a] commitment to the
commensurability of all an agent’s ends runs very deep in the Law and Economics
movement” but that it fails to describe the real world); Amartya Sen, Plural Utility, 81 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 193, 193 (1981) (arguing that welfare economics should understand
utility “primarily as a vector (with several distinct components), and only secondarily as
some homogeneous magnitude”).
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aggregation of probabilities in the other examples that involve just factual
uncertainty. To aggregate, a court would need to consider the underlying
rationales directly and create a new scale that reflects the relevant theoretical
considerations.
The same objection could be raised with respect to cases illustrated by our
public law Example IV.3 (Targeted Killing: Two “Almost Claims”). In this
example, the President claims two sources of authority for a targeted killing: a
statute that gives him the authority to use military force against Al Qaeda, and
his constitutional power to use military force abroad to protect American
interests. Here, too, assuming neither of the legal sources independently
provides the authority for targeted killing in the case at hand, a question arises
of whether aggregation could lead to a different outcome. Since the rationales
for the two authorizing legal sources are different, aggregation needs a
common scale according to which the combined weight of the two sources as
applied to the case at hand would be evaluated.
The commensurability argument might be doubted, however, because the
main philosophically distinctive concern about commensurability is that values
are incommensurable, and treating them as commensurable may do violence to
our moral intuitions. This philosophical concern has little to do with how the
law should be divided into claims, and claims into elements, which reflects
institutional rather than moral considerations. It is true that comparing values
of a different nature sometimes raises implementation difficulties, and those
difficulties should be taken into account in considering the desirability of some
kinds of aggregations. But when reduced to such a concern, the
commensurability argument appears to be just another way to make the
argument that aggregation has costs of implementation, which we have
discussed in Section V.A above.
3. Cognitive Limitations
Aggregation requires a kind of mental manipulation that might flummox
judges and juries. Consider factual aggregation. Courts do not use precise
standards of proof like 40%, 51%, and 95%. Instead, the standards of proof are
expressed in verbal formulations: preponderance of the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Given this constraint, courts would need to give juries
awkward instructions: “find in favor of the plaintiff if either claim A or claim B
is supported by the preponderance of the evidence, or if claim A and claim B
jointly are supported by the preponderance of the evidence even if they
individually are not.” In cases involving a large number of claims, the jury
instructions could quickly get out of hand. But even in simple cases, like the
one above, one might wonder whether juries are capable of making such fine
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gradations, which would, among other things, require them to implicitly
calculate joint probabilities while taking into account the degree of dependence,
if any, between the two events.168
A similar problem could also upset normative aggregation. In Example II.2
(Non-Material Breach and Misleading Conduct), the court would instruct the
jury to “find for the plaintiff if the defendant’s statements were fraudulent, the
defendant’s breach was material, or the two actions were sufficiently serious as
to warrant rescission.” For Example IV.4 (Free Exercise of Religion and Free
Speech), the court would find for the plaintiff if the law singled out religion
and imposed a burden on it, imposed an unreasonable burden on free speech,
or did not have either effect but imposed an unreasonable burden on the
plaintiff’s joint religion-speech rights. As in the case of factual aggregation, one
might worry that juries and judges would be incapable of making the sort of
fine-grained judgments that aggregation typically requires.169
Our response to the objections in both cases is that, while these concerns
are serious, they are also marginal: the law already requires legal
decisionmakers to engage in this type of mental manipulation. Legal standards
require decisionmakers to aggregate factual information and normative
considerations. Juries already must weigh probabilities of events and take into
account the extent of dependence of events—for example, whether two
witnesses who give the same testimony are entitled to extra weight because
they are independent sources of information, or less weight because they might
have collaborated or drawn on the same source of knowledge. Thus, while the
design of legal doctrine, including the uses of aggregation, should take
cognitive limitations into account, those limitations cannot by themselves
provide a sufficient reason for rejecting aggregation.
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See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for
Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (1987) (describing psychological research that
suggests that people’s minds process external stimuli by breaking them down into a small
number of discrete categories rather than points on a probability distribution); Elisabeth
Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in
Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769 (2000) (discussing
psychological literature on jurors’ ability to distinguish standards of proof). Saul Levmore
makes the interesting argument that if all (or a supermajority of) the members of the jury
believe that a factual allegation is more probable than not—say, by a probability of 51%—then
the probability of the allegation being true is in fact much higher than 51%. See Levmore, supra
note 8, at 739-45. Levmore suggests that this could be a reason not to aggregate, mainly in
cases of what we have called cross-element aggregation in this Article. Id.
The research described in Clermont, supra note 168, bears on this question as well.
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C. Implementation
While the goal of this Article is not to offer a comprehensive proposal for
courts and legislatures as to where exactly to aggregate and where not to
aggregate, we raise some implementation questions and offer preliminary
answers.
1. Sword and Shield
Procedurally, in most of the cases the plaintiff—or the prosecution in
criminal trials—would ask the court to aggregate, because in most of the cases,
aggregation would result in more liability or punishment. But as we have
pointed out, aggregation could also result in less liability or punishment,
depending on the circumstances. That raises the concern that plaintiffs and
prosecutors may ask for aggregation only when it benefits them and avoid
aggregation when it would hurt them by bringing suits in separate
proceedings.
To avoid this risk, we suggest that defendants should be able to raise an
aggregation defense—namely, to ask the court to aggregate claims brought
against them in separate proceedings. Courts already recognize procedures for
consolidating claims brought in separate proceedings, and we expect that these
procedures could be adapted for cases where aggregation problems arise. In
any event, we suspect that there are natural limits on such strategic behavior.
For example, plaintiffs and prosecutors will often prefer to use one court rather
than many courts just because it is cheaper.
2. One Trial
It is hard to imagine aggregation taking place when one claim is heard by
one judge or jury and another claim is heard by another judge or jury. The
main reason is the difficulty of implementation. We do not expect courts, when
they aggregate, to define the exact probabilities of each claim (factual
aggregation) or, alternatively, to define how close each claim is to the threshold
(normative aggregation). Instead, courts should work with approximations.
For example, a court should decide whether the plaintiff established, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that at least one of the two claims he made is
valid, or whether the aggregated normative weights of two “almost claims” he
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made is large enough to justify the imposition of liability. That process of
evaluation must be done by one court.170
But even if it were possible for courts to define the exact probabilities of
each claim, or the distance between an “almost claim” and a threshold, there
would be situations where aggregation between multiple courts would have
more negative than positive consequences. Suppose a criminal court convicted
a defendant of larceny and defined the probability of his guilt as 95% (like in
Example III.2). With aggregation, and assuming that 95% is the minimum
probability necessary for conviction, the defendant would have a “license” to
commit another larceny (or any less severe crime) with no punishment, as long
as he could be certain enough that the ex post probability of his guilt for the
second larceny in the second trial would be found lower than 100%. This is so
because with any probability lower than 100% for the second offense, the
probability that the defendant committed the two larcenies is lower than 95%,
and therefore the defendant should be punished for only one larceny.
In the preceding example, the aggregation of claims in different trials
would create underdeterrence. Sometimes the reverse is true. Suppose a doctor
is exonerated from liability in a medical malpractice case because the
probability of his wrongdoing is 45%. Now the doctor knows that in the next
case, when something goes wrong with another patient, the second patient
could impose liability by showing at a very low probability that he was
wronged by the doctor. Indeed, if factual aggregation across persons in such
cases were allowed,171 then the doctor would be overdeterred with respect to
the second patient. But it is still possible that in the long run aggregation
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Furthermore, in criminal cases, taking into account prior acquittals as a consideration for
convicting the same defendant in a subsequent trial could violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In civil cases, aggregation across trials might seem to violate
res judicata principles, but we believe it would not if aggregation in a subsequent trial were
based on the exact findings of the court in the first trial—which include the probabilities of
the parties’ factual allegations or their normative weight—and thus would stand in no
contradiction to them.
For aggregation across victims, see our discussion of Example I.8 (Mass Torts:
Indeterminate Plaintiffs), supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. Aggregation across trials
creates many more implementation difficulties. In particular, in the example discussed in the
text, aggregation would require apportioning the damages awarded in the subsequent trial
between the plaintiffs in both trials according to criteria that would need to be set for that
purpose. Aggregation across trials could be especially problematic—and objectionable—if it
requires a plaintiff who won in the first trial to surrender some of his proceeds to a
subsequent plaintiff. That could happen, for example, when the probability of each
plaintiff’s allegation being valid is higher than 50%, but the probability of both plaintiffs’
allegations being valid is lower than 50%.
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would do more good than bad in such cases, because it might improve
deterrence with respect to the first patient.
3. Crafting Remedies
In many cases, aggregation should not require new remedies: if each claim,
once accepted, would entail the same remedy, aggregation should trigger that
remedy.172
But there are cases where aggregation requires crafting new remedies.
Consider the case when each claim, if established, would have warranted a
different remedy, either in magnitude (e.g., different damages awards) or in
kind (e.g., damages and an injunction). Take Example I.3 (Injury in the
Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries). What amount of liability would be
imposed on the hospital? At a minimum, the hospital would be liable for the
less severe injury. Alternatively, the hospital could be liable for the average (or
perhaps a weighted average) of the two injuries, for the more severe injury, or
for a probabilistic recovery.173 Each of these options has both advantages and
disadvantages, depending on various considerations. From an efficiency
perspective,174 if courts could get all relevant information at low cost,
probabilistic recovery seems to be the optimal solution.175 If, however,
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See, e.g., Example II.1 (Either Material Breach or Fraudulent Misrepresentation), supra
Section II.A.
Liability could be derived from the exact probabilities of the injuries being wrongfully
caused by the hospital’s employees. Thus, if in Example I.3 the harm to the plaintiff’s leg is
100 and to the plaintiff’s heart 500, liability should amount to 240: a 16% chance that both
harms (100 + 500) were wrongfully caused, a 24% chance that only the harm to the leg
(100) was wrongfully caused, and a 24% chance that only the harm to the heart (500) was
wrongfully caused (16% * 600 + 24% * 100 + 24% * 500 = 240). If, however, we stick to the
principle that liability should be imposed only for the harm that has been established by the
preponderance of the evidence, the award of damages should be 100. Any other amount
would not satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. For this argument, and for
an illuminating discussion of possible applications of the preponderance-of-the-evidence
rule to cross-claim factual aggregation, see Alon Cohen, Implementing Aggregation in Law:
The Median Outcome Procedure (Aug. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors). Note, however, that one could make the argument that once liability is proven by
the preponderance of the evidence through aggregation of claims, the amount of damages
might be determined by a probabilistic recovery rule, even if the legal system precludes the
application of this rule to one stand-alone claim.
Liability in this case—in any form—would probably encounter the resistance of corrective
justice theorists. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of probabilistic recovery and its advantages and disadvantages compared to
aggregation, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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information is costly, the average injury, or something between the two
injuries, could be a better solution (the exact amount would depend on the
approximation of the likelihoods of the two injuries being wrongfully caused by
the doctors). If, however, there is a risk that aggregating the claims could result
in overdeterrence or underdeterrence,176 liability for the less severe or more
severe injury, respectively, could better serve efficiency.177
In other cases, a plaintiff could be entitled, through aggregation, to either
one type of remedy (say, damages) or another type of remedy (say, injunction),
or some combination of both, while none of those entitlements, standing
alone, can be established by the preponderance of the evidence. Courts could
leave the choice of remedy to the plaintiff or to the defendant, or create a
combination of the two remedies (for example, allowing the plaintiff to choose
between damages and injunction, but a more restrictive injunction than the
one he would have been entitled to if he had prevailed on his claim for
injunctive relief without aggregation). These problems might seem significant,
but in fact courts face similar problems under existing law, where it often
occurs that plaintiffs win multiple claims that entitle them to different
remedies, and courts must use discretion to choose among or combine the
remedies in an appropriate manner.178
conclusion
We have analyzed three types of aggregation in the law through various
examples in four central legal fields. In most of our examples, actual courts
would not aggregate. Furthermore, in most of the examples, a no-aggregation
rule is taken by courts for granted, as if no other choice exists. This is puzzling,
since courts sometimes do aggregate, and on many occasions the aggregation
rule better serves the substantive goals of the law. In the next paragraphs we
summarize our conclusions and provide recommendations for reform.
Factual aggregation. Within-element factual aggregation is routine and
raises no problems. Cross-element factual aggregation is somewhat more
complex, but is sometimes recognized in the law. Cross-claim factual
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See supra note 25.
Note that if the probabilities in Example I.3 were 60% instead of 40%, then the plaintiff,
although still allowed to recover for only one of the injuries under aggregation, would be
entitled to recover for the more severe injury. Any lower recovery would lead to the absurd
result that the plaintiff would be better off bringing one claim for a severe injury than
bringing that same claim alongside an additional claim for a less severe injury.
Thus, courts routinely award both specific performance and damages in contract cases, and
both an injunction and damages in nuisance cases.
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aggregation can cause more serious difficulties because various and sometimes
unpredictable legal consequences flow from the use of different claims. For this
reason, cross-claim factual aggregation should be avoided when aggregation
provides no, or minimal, benefits. We identified a few such cases: for example,
when the expected liability-enhancing and liability-reducing effects of
aggregation cancel out ex post, and so have no effect on ex ante incentives
(assuming that the law is concerned only with those ex ante incentives).179
Cross-claim factual aggregation should also be avoided when it involves a high
level of difficulty and may confuse the jury—for example, when the
probabilities are to a high degree dependent.180
Otherwise, courts should engage in cross-claim factual aggregation. It is
important to understand that cross-claim factual aggregation does not require
judges or juries to calculate probabilities with perfect precision; instead, the
court should ask itself whether the probability that at least one of two (or
more) claims is valid was proven at the level of proof required by the law
(preponderance of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, and so forth).
Cross-claim factual aggregation does not require courts to do something
different in nature from what they normally do—within-element aggregation.
Instead of asking only whether claim A is more probable than not, they should
also ask whether it is more probable than not that at least one of the two claims
A and B holds.
Note also that cross-claim factual aggregation should not have any effect on
legal norms, that is, substantive law. Its sole effect will be on the accuracy of
adjudication. If courts engaged in cross-claim factual aggregation, then people
would be more likely to conform their behavior to the requirements of the law.
Normative aggregation. Normative aggregation, like factual aggregation, is
not always called for. We saw a number of cases where normative aggregation
makes little sense because of the nature of the substantive law in question. For
example, from an economic perspective, “almost negligent” behavior is actually
socially desirable, so two or more instances of “almost negligent” behavior are
even more socially desirable than one.181 From a more conventional moral
perspective, we suspect that two or more negligent homicides would not be
considered as morally blameworthy as a single intentional homicide—although
threshold deontologists might permit aggregation above a certain level.182
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See supra p. 15.
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
See supra p. 22.
See EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 46 (2010)
(“[M]oderate deontology holds that constraints have thresholds. A constraint may be
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It may also be difficult for decisionmakers to distinguish fine gradations of
social harm or moral wrongfulness, or even if they can, for a jury to come to a
consensus about these matters. We suspect that considerations of this sort lie
behind the hostility to hybrid rights in constitutional law. But, as we have
emphasized, people make these sorts of judgments all the time, and expansive
standard-like norms in the law require such judgments without creating
insurmountable difficulties in practice.
Normative aggregation falls somewhere in the middle of the continuum
between rules and standards, but it is also special because it uses existing law as
building blocks rather than constructing an entirely new norm. While
standards require the court to apply policy or normative considerations directly
to the dispute, normative aggregation requires the court to apply existing rules,
albeit in combination. The advantage of normative aggregation is that it
provides more certainty and hence guidance than pure standards do.
As we have noted, normative aggregation takes two forms. First, courts
might directly or explicitly aggregate claims, exemplified by the hybrid rights
jurisprudence. This form of decisionmaking has an ad hoc, almost remedial
quality. The plaintiff shows that she has two claims, each with normative
weight that by itself is not enough to justify a remedy, but the cumulative
normative weight of the two claims is enough to justify a remedy.
Second, courts might indirectly aggregate claims by using the old claims as
building blocks to construct new claims. The unconscionability doctrine
illustrates this process. A plaintiff has two claims under an old legal regime that
are individually weak but jointly powerful; rather than give the plaintiff a
remedy based on the judgment that the claims are jointly strong, the court
recognizes a new claim that reflects the considerations that separately underlie
the old claims. This may well be one way that the law develops over time.183
Cross-person aggregation. Cross-person aggregation can be both factual and
normative. In many cases, the distinction is not always clear. For example, joint
criminal enterprise liability enables courts to convict a defendant who, beyond
a reasonable doubt, participated in crimes against at least one of a group of
victims, even when the identity of her specific victims cannot be ascertained.
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overridden for the sake of furthering good outcomes or avoiding bad ones if enough good or
bad is at stake.”).
It has been frequently argued that the law has been evolving from rules toward standards.
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1, 10 (1992). If so, one part of that process may result from the type of indirect
aggregation we describe, where courts replace narrow, rule-like claims with broader,
standard-like claims that aggregate the policy concerns that had previously been distributed
among the narrower claims.
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The same doctrine also enables courts to convict a defendant of a serious crime
when she, beyond a reasonable doubt, participated in minor crimes that
harmed a large number of victims.
Cross-person aggregation is in tension with traditional legal doctrines that
protect the rights of defendants. These doctrines are particularly strong in
criminal procedure, but they exist in civil procedure as well. These doctrines
are very old, and they are celebrated for, among other things, eliminating the
influence of morally reprehensible norms that at one time played a significant
role in legal systems—for example, holding children liable for the crimes of
their parents, or members of religious or ethnic groups liable for the crimes of
other members. The doctrines forced the government to show the moral
culpability of the defendant, and the causal connection between her actions and
the harm to a victim. But this requirement of showing the identity of the victim
turns out to be a significant hurdle to justice in a world in which harms are
often dispersed and their sources difficult to trace. Cross-person aggregation
permits courts to overcome this hurdle without at the same time increasing the
risk that people will be punished for harms that they did not cause.
We opened the Article with an observation that while individuals aggregate
reasons for decisions in their daily lives, they tend not to expose this way of
reasoning to other people. We would not be surprised if judges and jurors also
aggregate more than they say they do. Courts should not only aggregate
reasons when making decisions. They should make this process a more open
and consistent element of adjudication.
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